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INTRODUCTION  
Since the late 1990s, record labels have suffered from consistently 
decreasing annual revenues as a result of the rampant music piracy charac-
terizing the digital age. The traditional business model that music promot-
ers and distributors have utilized for the past century no longer seems 
efficient in the age of the Internet. In 1999, overall music sales reached a 
peak of $14.6 billion in total revenue.1 By 2009, that number had fallen to 
only $6.3 billion.2 CD sales in the United States exceeded 785 million 
albums in 2000; but by 2008, total album sales had decreased by almost a 
third.3 The year 2011 proved to be promising for record labels, as total 
album sales increased by 1.3 %, but the music industry’s struggles are likely 
to continue as album sales dropped 4% in 2012.4  
Despite the increased connectivity and access to information that digital 
technology provides us, the Internet has created a world where illegally 
shared, copied, and distributed music dominates the marketplace. The 
recording industry, however, continues to fail to adequately address the 
 
1 Tim Arango, Digital Sales Exceed CDs at Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at B1. 
2 David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/index.htm. 
3 See Michael C. Yeh, Comment, The Performance Rights Act: A Lack of Impact on a Transition-
ing Music Industry, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 217, 218 (2011) (explaining that this decline 
was mainly due to the proliferation of the Internet). 
4 Christopher Morris, UMG, Adele Top 2012 Album Sales, VARIETY (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118064165/?cmpid=NLCDailyHeadlines (“Overall album 
sales—which includes both albums and so-called ‘track equivalent’ digital albums—were off 1.8% 
compared to 2011. . . . CD sales shrank by 13.5% to 193 million and digital album downloads 
climbed 14% to almost 117.7 million, a record mark.”). 
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most significant problem facing the music industry—music piracy—and the 
resulting widespread harm to most music industry participants today.5  
Record labels suffer the most devastating effects of music piracy as their 
profits continue to decline.6 But decreasing annual revenues have also led to 
less funding and more one-sided record contracts for aspiring musicians.7 
Additionally, music consumers have been unable to experience and enjoy 
new and progressive forms of music delivery as Internet-based businesses 
and webcasters are stifled by rising costs and are forced to operate under a 
legal structure designed more for the mid-1900s than the 21st century. 
Some reports estimate that as much as 95 % of music is downloaded ille-
gally, for free, on a yearly basis.8 The digital transmission of music, includ-
ing peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing services, most of which developed 
following the creation of the infamous Napster service,9 allows infringers to 
create and distribute illegal copies of copyrighted music to the general 
public in a matter of seconds.10 Illegal downloading of pirated music 
 
5 See Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited May 
6, 2013) (“One credible study by the Institute for Policy Innovation pegs the annual harm at $12.5 
billion dollars in losses to the U.S. economy as well as more than 70,000 lost jobs and $2 billion in 
lost wages to American workers.”). 
6 While music piracy affects recording artists and labels throughout the world, this Comment 
is primarily concerned with the United States recording industry and the measures that can be 
taken on a domestic level. 
7 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 
83 (2011) (lamenting that labels are pushing their performing artists to accept so-called “360 deals,” 
which give record companies a share of revenue from endorsements, live performances, and 
merchandise sales—in addition to their standard share of revenue from record sales—despite the 
labels’ lack of expertise in these additional areas). 
8 INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009: NEW 
BUSINESS MODELS FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 22 (2009), available at http://www.ifpi. 
org/content/library/DMR2009.pdf; see also Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing for Internet 
Downloads and Streams: Would It Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 39, 43 (2011) (stating that 90% or more of P2P file transfers violate U.S. copyright laws and 
threaten the viability of companies that depend on copyright protection); Legal Downloads 
Swamped by Piracy, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009, 6:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/technology/7832396.stm (“[M]ore than 40 billion music files were illegally shared in 2008.”). 
But some commentators have argued that the overall negative effect of music piracy is not as 
detrimental as the music industry has propounded. See Catherine Rampell, The Music Industry, 
Post-Napster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/the-
music-industry-post-napster (citing a new study which claims that “Napster and its file-sharing 
descendants have not, in fact, reduced the entrance of new artists to the music market, even if 
piracy has made it harder to make a financial killing in the industry”). 
9 See Jared S. Welsh, Comment, Pay What You Like—No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should 
Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses, 58 EMORY L.J. 1495, 1514-17 (2009) (providing a 
detailed history of the rise and fall of Napster). 
10 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 75 (“P2P file sharing developed as an underground channel for 
unlicensed access to recorded music.”); Tyler Hardman, Note, Webcasting and Interactivity: Problems 
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continues to escalate despite the variety of legal downloading sites available 
today.11  
In response, the major labels and recording industry executives have 
consistently clamored for legislative assistance to combat diminishing yearly 
revenues due to music piracy.12 However, rather than adapt to new consumer 
preferences that are focused upon individualized customization and capitalize 
on the opportunities digital technology can provide, record labels have for 
the most part chosen to continue fighting to protect their outdated business 
models.13 Instead of overhauling their traditional practices to establish 
modernized approaches that properly respond to new technologies and 
consumer habits, record labels continue to demand more oppressive royalty 
rates and higher shares of revenue from less powerful market participants.14 
Most recently, record labels have proposed legislation that primarily 
benefits their economic interests, without considering the rights or needs of 
other music industry participants.15 
 
and Solutions, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 290, 291 (2011) (explaining that consumers can now 
access music “without ever stepping foot in a conventional retail store”).  
11 See Amy Duvall, Note, Royalty Rate-Setting for Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 288 (2008) (identifying iTunes and MP3.com as examples 
of legal downloading sites). 
12 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 76 (explaining that EMI’s worldwide revenue was £2.08 billion 
in 2006 and fell to £1.75 billion in 2007); see also Yeh, supra note 3, at 218 (“Music sales are not 
creating the same profits as before, and rather than change or adapt, record labels are petitioning 
the legislature to create new modes of revenue.”). 
13 See Yeh, supra, note 3, at 226 (explaining that online social networking sites now provide 
smaller artists with opportunities for direct interaction with music listeners, which renders the 
traditional record label model and distribution advantages increasingly obsolete). 
14 See, e.g., Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing that terrestrial 
radio stations pay sound recording copyright owners royalties where they have never been required 
to before). But see Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of 
Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 74-75 (2011) (explaining that the vast resources 
and expertise of record labels contribute to performing artists’ success and financial security in 
numerous ways). 
15 For examples of such proposed legislation, see H.R. 848. These proposals ask Congress to 
amend the Copyright Act to require traditional terrestrial radio (AM/FM) stations to pay 
musicians, recording artists, and other sound recording copyright owners for the right to play 
songs on the air. However, it has been recognized for decades that radio airplay offers recording 
artists and record labels free marketing; radio station broadcasts successfully peak the interests of 
music listeners, which “compels them to go out and buy the song or album.” Yeh, supra note 3, at 
224. For this reason, terrestrial radio stations have until now been exempt from having to pay 
recording artists and sound recording copyright owners any royalties for the public performance of 
such works. See also PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (providing for 
“enhancing enforcement against rogue websites operated and registered overseas”). Many of the 
more recent legislative proposals have been met with opposition and claims that the laws would 
violate certain fundamental rights and liberties. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (proposing that Congress expand U.S. copyright law enforcement to combat online 
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This Comment suggests that Congress should amend the Copyright Act 
to ensure that promising new music-based technologies are able to survive. 
The establishment of a compulsory license16 for interactive webcasters17 will 
help ensure that sound recording copyright owners are properly compen-
sated for their recordings and performances, while also guaranteeing that 
the public will be able to utilize these copyrighted works to their greatest 
benefit. As a result of the recording industry’s failed efforts to combat music 
piracy over the past two decades, Congress must concern itself with the 
interests and future viability of the entire music industry. By expanding 
compulsory licensing to cover both noninteractive and interactive 
webcasters, the dual purposes18 of copyright law envisioned in the Constitu-
tion19 can best be achieved.  
Through the establishment of compulsory licensing for interactive 
webcasters, music listeners will be able to consume copyrighted sound 
recordings in the most beneficial and preferred manner. A greater variety of 
music, in more easily consumable formats and through more accessible 
services, will then be made available to the public at affordable rates. 
Meanwhile, copyright owners will be better compensated as a result of the 
proliferation of personalized digital music services, and the resulting 
decrease in music piracy, as consumers recognize the value in the legal 
streaming of music. Market participants will no longer have to waste 
valuable resources on high-stakes litigation and lobbying efforts that often 
harm the reputation and public perception of the music industry. In the 
 
illegal trafficking in copyrighted intellectual property in ways that opponents claim will violate the 
First Amendment and cripple the Internet). 
16 Compulsory licensing provides a third party with the right to use copyrighted works with-
out the copyright owner’s permission so long as an established royalty fee is paid for such use. 
Also known as statutory licensing, compulsory licensing is primarily utilized in situations where 
high transaction costs prevent beneficial negotiations and agreements from taking place. See 
Andrew D. Stephenson, Comment, Webcaster II: A Case Study of Business to Business Rate Setting by 
Formal Rulemaking, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 393, 399 (2011) (explaining that transaction costs are 
lowered for both copyright owners and copyright users by the imposition of a statutory scheme for 
payment and collection of compulsory license rates). 
17 Webcasting is a means of distributing audio recordings to many simultaneous users using 
streaming media technology via the Internet. The term is used interchangeably with Internet 
radio, online broadcasting, and similar phrases throughout this Comment. See Digital Definitions, 
HARRY FOX AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com/public/DigitalDefinitions.jsp (last visited May 
6, 2013). 
18 The granting of copyrights is intended both to provide adequate compensation for authors 
of original works and to promote the progress of the arts for the benefit of the general public. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (describing the purposes of copyright law). 
19 See id.; see also Hardman, supra note 10, at 311 (“Protecting ‘traditional record sales’ . . . must 
stand in the shadow of the promotion of progress in the development of new technologies and 
forms of distribution.” (footnote omitted)). 
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process, consumers will recognize the benefits and low costs of interactive 
webcasting, and the consumer base of these webcasting companies will grow 
under a more balanced statutory scheme. Copyright owners, webcasters, and 
consumers will all benefit from an increased demand for legally accessible 
music and the proliferation of more affordable services that are personalized 
and individually tailored to consumer preferences.  
Part I of this Comment provides a discussion of the severe problems 
music piracy has generated for the recording industry over the past two 
decades and the many ways in which the recording industry has failed to 
combat the piracy epidemic. Part II outlines the advancement of music in 
the digital age, with a particular focus on the importance of streaming 
technology in the future. Part III chronicles the history of copyright 
protection for sound recordings, from the initial structure of the digital 
performance right to the current tripartite framework of the public perfor-
mance right in sound recordings. Part IV provides further details of the 
noninteractive webcasting royalty proceedings, detailing the key shortcomings 
of the current rate structure and the issues that industry participants have 
been grappling with for the past two decades. Part V argues that compulso-
ry licensing should be congressionally established for interactive webcasters 
and outlines the general structure that should be adopted. Lastly, Part VI 
provides a detailed discussion of the economic benefits an interactive 
webcasting compulsory license rate will have for the recording industry so 
long as Congress and the major record labels fully embrace streaming 
technology and interactive webcasting.  
I. THE MUSIC PIRACY EPIDEMIC 
The vast majority of U.S. copyrights in sound recordings are owned by 
three major record companies.20 This concentration stems from the com-
mon industry practice of sound recording artists assigning their intellectual 
property interests to these record labels through recording contract agree-
ments. In exchange, the sound recording artists receive distribution services, 
guaranteed compensation, and other benefits that they might not otherwise 
 
20 The three major record labels existing today are Universal Music Group, Sony Music 
Entertainment, and Warner Music Group. EMI Group, which was previously the fourth largest 
record label, was purchased by Universal Music Group in September 2012. See Morris, supra note 4 
(explaining that Universal Music Group continued as the market leader in 2012, with a market 
share totaling more than 39% after the EMI purchase, and “Sony Music Entertainment captured 
30.25% of the album market, [while] Warner Music Group took 19.15%”). 
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receive.21 Because most of the profits received from album and song sales 
accrue to record labels after the assigning of such rights, music piracy 
primarily diminishes the annual revenues garnered by these large record 
labels. By diminishing the operating budgets of record labels, however, 
music piracy also limits the opportunities available to recording artists; 
consequently, the supply and diversity of music that can be made available 
to consumers diminishes as well.22  
A.  Failed Efforts to Combat Piracy 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, sound recording copyright owners 
attempted to combat the rise of P2P networks and the proliferation of 
illegal copying and distribution of digital music files through litigation 
efforts. The threat of Napster23 in the late 1990s led to a series of copyright 
infringement suits against many of the large file sharing services that were 
created in Napster’s wake. Sound recording copyright owners initially 
experienced great success in high-profile lawsuits during the early 2000s.24 
As a result, many of the largest and most successful P2P networks offering 
permanent download services were shut down.25 But over time, young 
entrepreneurs and software developers recognized the shortcomings of prior 
centralized P2P services and created new file sharing services that are more 
streamlined for the user but more problematic for record labels and copyright 
 
21 However, with the rise of the Internet and the decreasing costs of production, distribution, 
and marketing of musical recordings, thousands of artists have chosen to maintain the copyrights 
in their own sound recordings. See MUSICFIRST, THE RADIO DISTORTION HANDBOOK 11 
(2009), available at http://www.musicfirstcoalition.org/sites/default/files/Radio%20Distortion%20 
Handbook%201-18%20Final.pdf (explaining that “many artists are . . . the sound recording 
copyright owners of their music”); see also Perritt, supra note 7, at 184-85 (estimating that the cost 
of producing an album has decreased drastically to about $12,500). But see Day, supra note 14, at 78 
(“Despite the rise in technological innovation, . . . it is estimated that the production cost of a 
pop-rock album is still over $200,000 . . . .”). 
22 See Day, supra, note 12, at 100-02 (explaining that decreased profits for record labels due to 
music piracy will result in less investment in new artists and thus a declining quantity and quality 
of music available to the public). 
23 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1514-17 (providing a detailed history of the rise and fall of Nap-
ster). 
24 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (hold-
ing that a distributor of P2P file sharing software was secondarily liable for the copyright 
infringement of end users under an inducement theory); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the P2P file sharing service could be held liable for 
contributory and vicarious infringement of sound recording copyrights). 
25 See, e.g., GROKSTER, http://www.grokster.com (last visited May 6, 2013) (“The United 
States Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that using this service to trade copyrighted 
material is illegal.”); LIMEWIRE, http://www.limewire.com (last visited May 6, 2013) (“LimeWire 
is under a court order . . . to stop distributing the LimeWire software.”). 
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owners.26 It soon became apparent to sound recording copyright owners that 
obtaining a verdict against such companies for secondary copyright in-
fringement was now much more uncertain and costly than ever before.27 
As a result, record labels and other copyright owners used individual 
lawsuits to enforce their rights against the actual illegal downloaders and 
end users of these P2P services. The Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), on behalf of sound recording copyright owners, sued more 
than 30,000 individuals who had illegally downloaded music over the 
Internet.28 However, while many of these cases resulted in favorable verdicts 
for the record labels,29 the labels abandoned this litigation strategy because 
of the high costs, the lack of a significant deterrent effect on the general 
public, and the judgment-proof status of many of the named defendants.30  
Not only did these individual lawsuits fail to stem the tide of music 
piracy,31 but also consumers rebelled and criticized the record labels for 
being greedy and unjust.32 In response, while some consumers turned to 
alternative legal forms of music distribution, many were incentivized to 
further engage in acts of music piracy in defiance of the RIAA lawsuits.33 
Consequently, the RIAA ceased filing these suits against individuals.34  
 
26 See, e.g., THE PIRATE BAY, http://www.piratebay.se (last visited May 6, 2013) (exemplifying 
new, more problematic sites). The Pirate Bay is a Swedish website that allows users to share 
electronic files through magnet links and .torrent files. 
27 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1518-20 (discussing how and why the music industry transi-
tioned from suing file sharing services to bringing claims against individual infringing end users). 
28 See Masur, supra note 8, at 44 (explaining that this legal strategy ultimately failed). 
29 See Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1012 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(reducing a previous $1.5 million jury award to $2250 per song downloaded), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 
(8th Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 07cv11446-NG, 2009 WL 4723397, at 
*2 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009) (ordering the payment of $675,000, which was later reduced to $67,500 
on due process grounds); see also Jon Healey et al., Song Swappers Face the Music, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 2003, at A1 (discussing the first wave of 261 lawsuits filed against individual infringers).  
30 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1519-20 (explaining that the backlash that resulted against the 
RIAA and copyright owners proved more costly than any benefits that could be obtained from 
these individual suits). 
31 For most consumers, the benefits of obtaining free music continued to outweigh the costs 
associated with the very low risk of being named a defendant in a copyright infringement suit. 
32 See  David J.  Moser,  Fi le  Sharing FAQ ,  CO PYRIGHT GU RU (2007),  http:// 
www.copyrightguru.com/file_sharing_faq.htm (explaining that “estimates indicate that the overall 
amount of file-sharing has not decreased and may have increased”).  
33 See Masur, supra note 8, at 44 (“[P]ursuing infringers ha[s] led to a backlash and consumer 
criticism, while still not making a significant dent in the amount of piracy.”). Why the current 
generation of music consumers does not view online music piracy as an immoral act, on par with 
the theft of physical chattels, is a question outside the realm of this Comment. 
34 See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 19, 2008, at B1 (explaining that the RIAA decided to pursue alternative enforcement 
strategies). 
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Nevertheless, the RIAA and record labels have continued to seek effec-
tive ways of curbing illegal file sharing. Record labels have begun to cooperate 
with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in terminating the Internet accounts 
of individuals engaging in significant illegal file sharing.35 Copyright owners 
have also attempted to protect their intellectual property interests through 
the use of digital rights management (DRM) and anti-circumvention 
measures.36 The goal of both of these approaches was to rely upon the quasi-
copyright protections established by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998 (DMCA) to ensure that sound recordings are properly protected 
from illegal use, copying, and distribution.37  
For the most part, however, record labels and music publishers have 
abandoned these approaches. Not only could many of the technologies 
protecting digital files easily be circumvented, but also consumers began to 
refuse to pay for the higher costs associated with such protections and 
technologies.38 Because companies were passing their costs on to end users 
for technologies that only benefited copyright owners, consumers responded 
by demanding DRM-free media.39 Most damagingly, passionate consumers 
began to feel that they were morally permitted to illegally circumvent such 
protections and distribute DRM-free files to other users.40 
B.  New and Innovative Ways to Combat Piracy 
Not all efforts to combat music piracy have failed. Industry participants 
can still obtain adequate compensation for the creation of musical works and 
sound recordings.41 Recent innovative efforts by successful and popular 
 
35 See Gary Myers & George Howard, The Future of Music: Reconfiguring Public Performance 
Rights, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 207, 221-22 (2010) (detailing the many ways record labels and 
copyright owners have attempted to address and combat music piracy). 
36 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1520 (discussing how these attempts to prevent copying of digital 
files ultimately failed). 
37 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–02 (2006). 
38 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1520 (explaining why the recording industry moved away from 
using DRM). 
39 See id. (calling DRM “virtually unworkable in practice”). 
40 See Digital Rights Management: A Failure in the Developed World, a Danger to the Developing 
World, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 23, 2005), https://www.eff.org/wp/digital- 
rights-management-failure-developed-world-danger-developing-world (explaining that DRM 
technology “has been in wide deployment for a decade with no benefit to artists and with 
substantial cost to the public and to due process, free speech and other civil society funda-
mentals”). 
41 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 136-37 (explaining that the demand function for individual 
songs or albums of an artist depends upon price, quality, transaction costs of obtaining the music, 
identification and altruistic feelings toward the copyright owner, popularity, convenience of being 
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performance artists serve as an example of how embracing new forms of 
technology and recognizing changing consumer preferences can be an 
effective way to combat the music piracy epidemic.  
Most notably, in an attempt to effectively use new distribution technologies, 
Radiohead, a band who retained the copyrights in their sound recordings 
instead of assigning them to a record label, chose to release their seventh 
album as a digital download through their website.42 The album was offered 
free of charge, but the band invited fans to pay whatever they desired for 
the download.43 The band utilized positive public relations and clever 
marketing to tailor the distribution of their music to consumer preferences 
and new forms of social media.44  
While this form of distribution may not be possible for smaller bands 
lacking the large fan base and vast resources of Radiohead, record labels and 
artists should take notice. As technology further advances and the world 
becomes more connected through the Internet, such new and innovative 
ways of distributing music and providing consumers with more affordable 
options will become dominant.45 After all, Radiohead not only enjoyed 
extensive positive publicity from this distribution choice, but also garnered 
payments from consumers that ranged up to $212, received payment from 
two out of five downloaders, and overall averaged about $2.26 per album 
download, which is more than they would have received under a standard 
recording contract.46 
This Comment does not intend to suggest that the recording industry is 
behaving in an unmerited or illogical manner by attempting to protect its 
intellectual property. The music industry has faced an almost impossible 
task in recent years as illegal file sharing has become more convenient, 
cheaper, and seemingly morally acceptable. However, thousands of smaller 
artists have recognized the changing landscape of music and the new forms 
 
able to listen to the music, probability of obtaining corrupted files, and probability of facing a 
lawsuit). 
42 See Mark Binelli, The Future According to Radiohead, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 7, 2008, at 55 
(detailing the unique approach to selling albums taken by the band). 
43 See id. 
44 See Greg Kot, Radiohead’s ‘In Rainbows’ Experiment Pays Off with 3 Million Sales, CHI. 
TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://leisureblogs.chicagotribune.com/turn_it_up/2008/10/radioheads-in-
r.html (explaining that as a result of this promotional campaign, Radiohead’s album topped the 
Billboard charts in early 2008 and achieved physical and digital sales of about three million albums 
combined). 
45 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 171-72 (noting that Nine Inch Nails, Beastie Boys, and David 
Byrne of Talking Heads all recently made certain songs available through a Creative Commons 
noncommercial attribution license that permits free use of the recordings, contingent upon any 
derivative works being made available under the same terms and conditions). 
46 Binelli, supra note 42, at 55. 
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of distribution that are available in the twenty-first century. Individual 
artists and bands are beginning to capitalize on unique opportunities to 
engage with consumers and music listeners in ways that promote positive 
publicity. Record labels should follow suit and recognize that by embracing 
new technologies and tailoring their marketing and distribution efforts to 
align with new consumer preferences, annual revenues can begin to rise 
again as music piracy is more effectively contained. Furthermore, record 
labels and copyright owners should recognize the benefits that streaming 
technology can provide the entire industry.  
II.  THE MODERNIZATION OF MUSIC 
For the past few decades, the distribution of music has drastically shifted 
from the traditional record label model that is dependent upon the sale of 
physical records, CDs, and albums to the transmission and delivery of 
digital music files and individual songs.47 In fact, it is estimated that by 
2020, Internet radio will almost equal weekly listenership of terrestrial radio 
stations.48  
In 2012, digital album sales accounted for more than one in three albums, 
enjoying a 20% increase from 2010 to 2011, achieving a 14% increase from 
2011 to 2012, and reaching a record 117.7 million consumer purchases.49 
Digital sales as a whole, which include not only album sales, but also 
individual song purchases and music videos, hit an all-time high of 1.66 
billion in 2012, 3.1% higher than in 2011.50 Internet webcasters now garner an 
audience of consumers that is estimated to exceed 100 million per month.51 
 
47 See Charles Sykes, Album Sales Are Looking Up, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2012, at D3 (docu-
menting how digital sales rose to 50.3% of all music sales, eclipsing physical sales for the first 
time); see also Myers & Howard, supra note 35, at 213-14 (arguing that there is the potential to 
increase the income of music industry participants by modernizing the royalty rate scheme and 
focusing on new revenue streams). 
48 See Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound Recording Perfor-
mance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REV. 179, 200 (2009) (discussing industry 
projections and the role of Internet radio in the future). 
49 See Morris, supra note 4 (reporting changes in album sales). 
50 See Agence France-Presse, Digital Music Commerce Hits New High in 2013 at 1.66 Billion 
Sales, THE RAW STORY (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/01/04/digital-music-
commerce-hits-new-high-in-2013-at-1-66-billion-sales (noting the growth of digital music sales). 
51 See Paul Resnikoff, More Than 100 Million Americans Now Listen to Online Radio . . ., 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/ 
120410radio (“According to just-released survey data from Edison Research and Arbitron, 103 
million Americans are now accessing online radio in some form, in any month.” (emphasis 
omitted)). The rise of mobile technology and services has also provided a “tremendous growth 
opportunity for radio,” as “45% of Internet radio users are listening on a mobile device—with 84% 
of them listening [up] to 1-3 hours per day.” Report: Internet Radio Ad Revenue Up 21%, NET-
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This growth has resulted in expansive opportunities for effective advertising 
as digital music webcasting grows in popularity.52  
Meanwhile, in 2011, physical album sales fell 5% to 228 million,53 and 
sales shrank an even greater percentage in 2012, dropping to 193 million.54 
Sales of CDs have declined each year for the past six years, with an overall 
net reduction of more than 60% compared to the peak years of the late 
1990s.55 Consumers are increasingly turning to online distribution services 
like iTunes56 that allow them to purchase music in the form of individual 
digital songs. Thus, while the creation and advancement of streaming 
technology has contributed immensely to this drastic decrease in physical 
album sales over the past two decades,57 the rise of digital album and song 
sales provides hope for the industry in the future.  
A.  The Rise of Streaming Technology 
In 1994, terrestrial radio stations began streaming content over the 
Internet.58 Streaming is a unique form of digital technology where a user’s 
computer receives “time- and location-sensitive streams” that are reassembled 
 
NEWSCHECK (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.netnewscheck.com/article/14074/report-internet-radio-
ad-revenue-up-21; see also Stephenson, supra note 16, at 397 (discussing the profitability of the 
modern music industry and commercial webcasting services).  
52 See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 397 (explaining that Internet radio broadcasters enjoyed 
$500 million in advertising revenue in 2006); Ben Sisario, Pandora and Spotify Rake in the Money 
and Then Send It Off in Royalties, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://mediadecoder.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2012/08/24/pandora-and-spotify-rake-in-the-money-and-then-send-it-off-in-
royalties (noting that Pandora, which makes the majority of its revenue from advertisements, 
reported total revenue of $81 million in the second quarter of 2012 alone). 
53 See Morris, supra note 4; see also Perritt, supra note 7, at 89-90 (providing detailed statistics 
of decreasing CD sales over the past decade). 
54 See Morris, supra note 4. 
55 Perritt, supra note 7, at 89-90. 
56 See generally ITUNES, http://www.itunes.com (last visited May 6, 2013). iTunes was creat-
ed by Apple in 2001 and today is the largest music retailer in the United States. In the face of 
diminishing profits for record labels and the widespread piracy that is threatening to destroy the 
music industry, iTunes has been called “a beacon of hope” and has been credited with saving the 
music industry. See Jesse A. Bland, Note, Biting the Hand That Feeds: Why the Attempt to Impose 
Additional Performance Fees on iTunes Is a Search for Dollars Without Sense, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 157, 162-63 (2011) (attributing the expansive growth of digital music sales to iTunes).  
57 Streaming technology allows real-time playing of a song while a constant link is main-
tained between the server and end user. Most notably, streaming media does not allow a perma-
nent copy of the file to be downloaded to the user’s computer, and a song can only be heard again 
by connecting to the Internet and streaming the file again. See Bland, supra note 56, at 163-64 
(distinguishing between permanent downloads and streaming media). 
58 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 303 (noting that these transmissions were initially of very 
poor quality). 
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using a specific program designed for different types of media.59 Known as a 
“player,” this program collects and reconstructs a song in a “buffer,” which 
is a form of temporary RAM storage.60 When a sufficient number of 
streams have been collected, providing the user with the initial seconds or 
minutes of a song, the song can be played even while the computer contin-
ues to receive additional streams to acquire the entire song in the temporary 
RAM storage.61 However, unlike permanent downloads, which are saved to 
the user’s computer and can be quickly played again, “once [a] song is 
finished playing, the buffer is emptied,” and a copy is not retained on the 
user’s computer.62 
The creation of software allowing for the compression of digital files 
while maintaining outstanding sound quality began the rapid proliferation 
of Internet streaming and webcasting.63 As webcasting grew in popularity 
and the Internet became faster and more accessible, consumer preferences 
shifted, and music listeners demanded a greater variety of Internet radio 
services and increased customizability.64 Today, online music services such 
as Pandora65 provide consumers with the ability to listen to millions of 
songs for free.66 These types of “noninteractive” webcasters allow users to 
create and manage personalized music stations that center around specified 
genres, bands, or even songs.  
Another subset of webcasters provides consumers with “on-demand,” or 
fully customizable services, where users can select individual and specific 
 
59 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 268 (detailing the process by which streaming technology 
operates in terms of sound recordings). 
60 Id. at 268-69. 
61 Id. Video content, as well as audio content, can be distributed through streaming technology. 
62 See id. at 269 (explaining the key difference between downloaded music files and streams). 
63 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 93-94 (“Digital recording technologies make it possible to pro-
duce perfect copies of recorded music cheaply and quickly. Compression algorithms embedded in 
software known as ‘codecs’ produce relatively small files that can be distributed in a few seconds 
via the Internet.”); see also Bland, supra note 56, at 175 (discussing how the first technology for 
streaming audio—RealAudio—was developed and released).  
64 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 303 (discussing the evolution of the Internet radio industry). 
65 See generally PANDORA RADIO, http://www.pandora.com (last visited May 6, 2013). Pandora 
is a free, ad-supported service allowing music listeners to create semi-customized music channels. 
It is also available for smartphones and other mobile devices, and additional content is available 
for a low monthly subscription fee.  
66 See Mary Ann Lane, ‘Interactive Services’ and the Future of Internet Radio Broadcasts, 62 ALA. 
L. REV. 459, 459 (2011) (explaining that various webcasters provide consumers with instant access 
to “free” music); see also Perritt, supra note 7, at 71 (“Printed scores, broadcast radio, recording 
technologies, and audio amplification all changed the way music was made, distributed and 
consumed[,] . . . like the more recent proliferation of small computers linked to the Internet  . . . .”). 
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songs to be played at any time.67 Under the current copyright regime, such 
“interactive” services are more costly to administer due to the higher royalty 
rates that must be negotiated directly with copyright owners.68 As a result, 
many interactive webcasters have chosen not only to bring in revenue 
through advertising, but also to charge consumers subscription fees for 
access to, and use of, their multimillion-song databases.69  
Nevertheless, whether music is offered to the public free of charge or for 
a low monthly fee, it has never been easier or more affordable for consumers 
to hear the music that they want to hear, when they want to hear it.70 With 
the advent of iPods,71 smart phones,72 wireless internet,73 3G networks,74 and 
cloud computing,75 consumers can enjoy music almost anywhere and at any 
time.76 As Internet access becomes more widespread and versatile, music 
consumers using services such as Pandora, Spotify,77 or Grooveshark78 “will 
 
67 See Kevin Purdy, Battle of the Streaming Music Services, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://lifehacker.com/5608715/battle-of-the-streaming-music-services (comparing many of the most 
popular on-demand streaming music services). 
68 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006) (outlining the tripartite structure of the digital public 
performance right). 
69 See RHAPSODY, http://www.rhapsody.com (last visited May 6, 2013) (“[A]ll the music 
[you want] all day everyday for $10 a month.”); see also Matthew Johnson, Understanding Royalty-
Bearing Companies #2: Rhapsody, SONGTRUST (Feb. 24, 2011), http://blog.songtrust.com/industry-
profiles/understanding-royalty-bearing-companies-2-rhapsody (explaining the general structure 
and royalty payment scheme of Rhapsody). 
70 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1525-26 (explaining that, despite the decreasing annual profits 
experienced by the music industry over the past decade, the rise of digital technology and 
distribution has increased demand from consumers). 
71 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 65 (explaining that the “iPod permit[s] consumers to listen to 
music all the time and this enormously increases the potential demand for music”). 
72 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 311 (explaining that smart phones enable a large percentage 
of the population to listen to music via webcasting, even where wireless networks are not available). 
73 See Day, supra note 14, at 102 (explaining that the government is urging Internet providers 
to drastically increase Internet speeds and access for American consumers by 2020). 
74 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 311 (noting that “3G networks are expanding every day, and 
still faster networks are currently in their beginning stages of development”). 
75 See Whitson Gordon, Cloud Music Comparison: What’s the Best Service for Streaming Your 
Library Everywhere?, LIFEHACKER (June 15, 2011), http://lifehacker.com/5812138/cloud-music-
comparison-whats-the-best-service-for-streaming-your-library-everywhere (explaining that “a number 
of cloud music services allow you to stream your music to nearly everything—laptops, tablets, 
smartphones—with minimal effort or tech know-how”). 
76 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1512-13 (explaining that the massive decrease in revenue for 
record labels is a result of the increasing amount of data that can be stored on computer hard 
drives and portable music players, such as the iPod, the dramatic increase in Internet speeds over 
the past decade, and the introduction of the MP3 file format that has greatly compressed digital 
files). 
77 See SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com (last visited May 6, 2013). Spotify is a Swedish 
streaming music service that allows users to search for music within a library of over 15 million 
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have little or no need to keep digital copies of the songs they want to 
hear.”79  
B.  The Current Potential of Streaming Services 
Consumers have recognized that streaming technology provides signifi-
cant savings in cost and convenience when compared to traditional owner-
ship of CDs or records.80 As a result, executives of entertainment companies 
in various industries are beginning to place an increasing emphasis on 
streaming technology.81  
As of 2008, nearly half of all Americans had listened to music on the 
Internet, with about one in every eight Americans listening to music online 
regularly.82 In just four years, that number has grown to over 100 million 
people—about one in every three Americans—accessing online radio in 
some form each month.83 The proliferation of webcasting services and their 
increased use by consumers can be attributed to the fact that digital trans-
mission services do not suffer from the same geographical limitations that 
other forms of delivery must contend with.84 There is seemingly no limit to 
 
songs. Visual and audio advertising support the free version of Spotify, while a paid premium 
subscription allows higher bitrate streams and offline access to the service. 
78 See GROOVESHARK, http://www.grooveshark.com (last visited May 6, 2013). Grooveshark 
serves as an example of an almost pure “on-demand” service. Consumers themselves upload copies 
of songs from their own computers, allowing other users to search for and listen to specific songs, 
albums, or artists. Copyrighted sound recordings can be listened to repeatedly as long as a user is 
connected to the service. However, the company does not provide consumers with the ability to 
download or copy files from other computers in permanent form on their own computers. Users 
can only listen to songs by accessing the Internet.  
79 Hardman, supra note 10, at 304. 
80 See, e.g., Netflix Users Stream More Than 2 Billion Hours, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2012, at B9 
(explaining that Netflix has experienced greater success as it shifts more towards streaming 
content). 
81 See Christina Warren, 5 of the Best Streaming Media Services Compared, MASHABLE (Feb. 
14, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/02/14/streaming-media-comparison (reviewing five different 
streaming media providers in the music, television, and motion picture industries). 
82 The percentage of teenage Americans and young adults who listen to music regularly 
online is most likely much higher due to their more pronounced acceptance and use of twenty-first 
century technologies. See Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Teens Listen to Music Most on YouTube, 
Pay for Music More Than Other Age Groups, Nielsen Study Says, BILLBOARD (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1084161/business-matters-teens-listen-to-music-most- 
on-youtube-pay-for-music-more (“Teens are obviously more digitally adept than other age 
groups . . . .”). 
83 See Resnikoff, supra note 51 (evaluating the usage of online radio). 
84 For a more detailed discussion of the various ways that webcasting improves the digital 
distribution of music in today’s world, see Kaitlin M. Pals, Note, Facing the Music: Webcasting, 
Interactivity, and a Sensible Statutory Royalty Scheme for Sound Recording Transmissions, 36 J. CORP. 
L. 677, 692 (2011).  
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the number of webcasts or level of customization that consumers can enjoy. 
Thus, if properly harnessed, webcasting can result in the promotion of a 
greater variety and quantity of music.  
Furthermore, online services are now able to utilize technology that 
exposes consumers to additional music that they will potentially enjoy, 
based upon their demonstrated musical preferences.85 Webcasting provides 
a unique way for the music industry to ensure customer satisfaction by 
allowing listeners to hear full songs before purchasing copyrighted works. In 
fact, many studies have shown that regular online music listeners are the 
most likely demographic to purchase physical CDs or digital albums, buying 
the works of artists that they hear for the first time on Internet radio 
stations or webcasting services.86  
The music industry should recognize the benefits that webcasting can 
provide and adopt a new business model that fully embraces the evolution 
of technology and the preferences consumers display for interactive streaming 
services.87 The history of sound recording copyright protection and public 
performance rights must be understood properly before innovative stream-
ing technologies can be harnessed to combat music piracy and raise industry 
revenues. Only then can the congressional mistakes of the past be heeded 
and the survival and future growth of the recording industry be ensured.  
III.  THE HISTORY OF THE SOUND RECORDING PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE RIGHT 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the right to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”88 Though copyright protection is not granted 
exclusively to incentivize the production of unique and creative works for 
the benefit of society, many of the amendments and changes Congress has 
enacted in the Copyright Act since 1790 focused on the economic incentives 
 
85 See id. at 692 n.136 (discussing the use of algorithms to match content to consumer prefer-
ences).  
86 See id. at 692-93 (citing various studies that display the positive effects that Internet radio 
has on CD sales). 
87 See Welsh, supra note 9, at 1522 (explaining that “new technologies have actually helped to 
increase the demand for recorded music by making its consumption more convenient and reducing 
search costs[,] . . . [yet] the industry continues to lose profits. . . . protecting its entrenched 
capital [and] defending its outdated methods in court rather than updating them”); see also Duvall, 
supra note 11, at 289 (“Just as the entertainment industry has been forced to adapt due to 
technological changes, so too should the music industry adjust to webcasting.”). 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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copyright protection can provide.89 By properly incentivizing creators, 
Congress seeks to ensure that copyrighted material continues to be pro-
duced and made available to the public so that individuals can receive 
maximum benefit from their use.90  
In 1897, Congress extended copyright protection to written musical 
compositions in order to ensure that proper compensation would continue 
to incentivize the production of such beneficial works for society.91 The 
Copyright Act of 1909 granted authors certain property rights in their 
musical creations: the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, create 
derivative works, publicly perform, and publicly display these types of 
works.92  
A recorded piece of music is comprised of two distinct copyrightable 
elements: the underlying musical work and the sound recording of that 
musical work.93 The songwriter or composer of a song obtains copyright 
protection in the musical work, which consists of the lyrics and melody that 
is fixed in some tangible form.94 This is the form of copyright that has been 
recognized since the Copyright Act of 1909. Conversely, sound recording 
copyrights are usually owned by the artist or record label and are distinct 
from the underlying musical work.95 A sound recording is the actual per-
formed version of a song, fixed in a tangible medium of expression, such as 
a compact disc, album, or digital file.96 
 
89 See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (explaining that the purpose of the passage of 
certain portions of the Copyright Act of 1909 was to ensure that “the composer [received] an 
adequate return for all use made of his composition”). 
90 See Pals, supra note 84, at 678 (explaining how Congress has struggled to balance the interests 
of creators and the public as technology has changed). 
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2009). 
92 See id. § 106. 
93 See  id. § 102(a)(2), (7). 
94 Though musical works are closely related to sound recordings, a detailed discussion of the 
copyright protections provided to songwriters and composers is outside the realm of this 
Comment. For more information, see DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 206-08 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining the common arrangements 
songwriters enter into with publishers). 
95 See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1312-14 (3d ed. 2002) 
(explaining the distinct divide between musical work and sound recording copyrights in the 
performance and reproduction contexts). This division is not particularly helpful to consumers. See 
Duvall, supra note 11, at 271 (“This initial division of the two rights appears inefficient and 
influenced much more by the actual copyright holders than the copyright users.”). 
96 See Yeh, supra note 3, at 222 (explaining in further detail the difference between musical 
works and sound recordings). 
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A.  Early History of Sound Recording Rights 
Congress did not amend the Copyright Act to recognize limited copy-
right protection for sound recordings of musical compositions until 1971.97 
For the first time, artists and record labels could license their works and 
receive compensation for the production of musical sound recordings.98 The 
primary purpose of the Sound Recordings Act of 1971 (SRA), which was 
subsequently retained in the Copyright Act of 1976, was to ensure that 
unauthorized reproductions and distributions of sound recordings would be 
made illegal under federal law.99  
Due to opposition from broadcasters and music publishers, however, the 
SRA and Copyright Act of 1976 did not recognize an exclusive right in the 
public performance of sound recordings.100 The right was limited to only 
the distribution and reproduction of such sound recordings.101 Thus, only 
composers and music publishers were given the right to receive royalties 
from public performances through a compulsory license established by 
Congress, while owners of the sound recordings did not receive any com-
pensation for the public performance of their works.102  
B.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 
As the Internet became a central part of life, and the creation of stream-
ing technology in the early 1990s provided music pirates with a new means 
of engaging in illegal reproduction and distribution, the recording industry 
recognized that the traditional music licensing structure did not adequately 
 
97 See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (establishing the 
right “[t]o reproduce and distribute to the public . . . sound recording[s]”). 
98 See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET AL., THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINI-
TIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 63-64 (Robert Nirkind et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007) 
(discussing the early history of federal copyright protection for sound recordings). 
99 See Lane, supra note 66, at 461 (explaining that piracy was the primary concern behind the 
SRA). 
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976); see also Performance Royalty: Hearings on S. 1111 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1-4 
(1975) (statement of Sen. Hugh Scott, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (identifying the 
broadcasting industry’s opposition to performance royalty payments). 
101 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 95, at 1296 (“Conspicuously absent from the list of works 
[in the Copyright Act] in which a copyright owner may exercise the exclusive right of public 
performance is the sound recording.”). 
102 See Lane, supra note 66, at 462 (explaining that such public performance rights were omit-
ted purposefully for sound recordings). 
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compensate or protect copyright owners of sound recordings.103 The indus-
try as a whole feared that online music piracy could have devastating effects 
on yearly revenues and profits for companies and artists offering musical 
works and sound recordings to consumers.104  
The four major record companies at the time, along with other influential 
industry participants, adamantly urged Congress to address the threat that 
satellite and digital technologies posed to sound recording copyright owners 
due to the lack of a public performance right under the Copyright Act.105 As 
a result, in 1995, Congress finally enacted the Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA), which granted copyright owners in 
sound recordings the exclusive right to “perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”106 
By creating a new digital public performance right for sound recordings 
and broadening the compulsory license structure to address the proliferation 
of webcasting and online music downloading, the DPRSRA recognized and 
attempted to respond to the perceived threat that the Internet presented to 
the music industry.107 The DPRSRA first established that all transmissions 
and broadcasts are public performances under the Copyright Act and then 
granted the copyright owner of a sound recording the exclusive right to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital-audio trans-
mission.108 Of particular importance to this Comment, the DPRSRA’s main 
structure distinguished between interactive and noninteractive services.109  
The DPRSRA initially created three distinct categories to reflect the 
fact that certain types of musical services present copyright owners with 
more serious concerns and potential problems related to the protection of 
their exclusive bundle of property rights than other music services do.110 
 
103 See Lane, supra note 66, at 462 (discussing the arguments made before Congress by vari-
ous record labels in favor of amending copyright law protections); Day, supra note 48, at 184 
(same). 
104 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13 (1995) (“[T]he Committee has sought to address the con-
cerns of record producers and performers regarding the effects that new digital technology and 
distribution systems might have on their core business . . . .”). 
105 See id. at 11-12 (explaining that these new technologies threatened the viability of the 
record industry). 
106 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 
336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2009)). 
107 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 95, at 1295-96 (discussing the DPRSRA as a response to 
concerns that previous copyright laws could not be enforceable in a digital world). 
108 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2009); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995, § 3, 109 Stat. at  343-44. 
109 See id. (defining an “interactive service”). 
110 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995) (explaining the reasoning behind the establishment 
of a tripartite system). 
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The first category focused on digital audio transmissions offered by interac-
tive services. This category required authorization from and payment to the 
copyright owner for each sound recording offered to consumers.111 The 
DPRSRA defined an “interactive service” as “one that enables a member of 
the public to receive, on request, a transmission of a particular sound 
recording chosen by or on behalf of the recipient.”112 Congress and the 
music industry recognized, and continue to believe, that these interactive 
services present the greatest threat to music sales and yearly revenues.113  
The second category subjected noninteractive, subscription-based services 
to a compulsory license.114 At the time, Congress believed that subscription 
fees would primarily support Internet radio stations, and thus the compul-
sory license fee would result in extra revenue for the music industry.115 
However, in practice, online radio stations recognized the lucrative oppor-
tunities presented by Internet advertising and chose to offer services that 
were both noninteractive and nonsubscription-based and thus fall outside of 
the category subject to a compulsory license.116  
Therefore, most services chose to structure their business models to fall 
within the third category of the DPRSRA. This category included services 
that were both noninteractive and nonsubscription. These services were 
exempted from paying the sound recording copyright owner for the use of 
the sound recording under the DPRSRA.117 As a result, sound recording 
copyright owners were not compensated when their works were publicly 
performed on traditional radio broadcasts or on the majority of Internet 
radio stations existing at the time.  
C.  DMCA Amendments 
Three years later, Congress recognized its failure to properly address the 
dangers that Internet radio and webcasting presented to the music indus-
try.118 As a result, Congress more effectively addressed the concerns raised 
 
111 See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995. 
112 Id. § 3, 109 Stat. at 343. 
113 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (“Of all the new forms of digital transmission services, 
interactive services . . . pose the greatest threat to the livelihoods of those whose income depends 
upon revenues derived from traditional record sales.”). 
114 See § 3, 109 Stat. at  338. 
115 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 95, at 1299-1300 (explaining that this belief was the 
“major blunder” of the DPRSRA). 
116 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13-15 (explaining that nonsubscription broadcasts are 
exempt from the public performance right). 
117 See § 3, 109 Stat. at 336-37 (listing exempt transmissions). 
118 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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by Internet webcasting with the passage of the DMCA in 1998. While the 
DMCA was primarily intended to ensure that adequate compensation 
accrued to copyright owners of sound recordings, it also represented a 
conscious attempt to protect beneficial new technologies and forms of media 
consumption and distribution.119  
The major change from the DPRSRA was the DMCA’s extension of 
compulsory licensing to sound recordings provided through noninteractive, 
nonsubscription digital audio transmissions.120 This amendment to the 
DPRSRA defined nonsubscription transmissions to encompass webcasting, 
which subjected Internet radio broadcasts to the same compulsory licensing 
scheme as subscription digital audio transmissions.121 Thus, only traditional 
terrestrial radio stations were exempted from the payment of sound record-
ing royalties to copyright owners.122 Notably, in 2000, the Copyright Office 
ruled that even transmissions by terrestrial radio stations via the Internet 
were no longer exempt from the sound recording digital performance 
right.123 Thus, the DMCA amendments subjected almost all digital trans-
missions of music to some form of a compensation requirement payable to 
sound recording copyright owners.124  
Of particular importance, the DMCA continued to distinguish between 
“interactive” and “noninteractive” streaming transmissions.125 In an effort to 
ensure that Internet radio stations would not displace high revenue physical 
album sales,126 the DMCA required that interactive webcasters negotiate 
directly with sound recording copyright owners to obtain digital performance 
 
119 See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that the goal of the DMCA was “protecting sound recording copyright holders to promote sales, 
distribution, and development of new music, [while] . . . making development of new media 
and forms of distribution ‘economically []feasible’” (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-274, at 14)). 
120 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2009). 
121 See id. (including “eligible nonsubscription transmission services” under the public 
performance right); § 405, 112 Stat. at 2898 (1998).  
122 See Ira Hoffman, Note, Pseudo-Interactivity: An Appropriate Rate Scheme for Customizable 
Internet Radio Services, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1515, 1520 (2011) (explaining that traditional radio 
play was exempted because it provided free exposure for artists and sound recordings and was 
believed to actually increase record sales); see also Day, supra note 48, at 187 (explaining that fewer 
digital transmissions were excused from paying royalties following the passage of the DMCA). 
123 See Copyright Office Rulemaking, Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition 
of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000) (upheld by the Third Circuit in Bonneville Int’l 
Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
124 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2009) (establishing the scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings). 
125 See id. § 114(d)(2)-(4) (outlining the distinction).  
126 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995) (explaining the intricacies of the DMCA 
amendments); see also KOHN & KOHN, supra note 95, at 1329 (“[I]nteractive streams of musical 
works will tend to displace sales of CDs . . . .”). 
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licenses for their services.127 However, noninteractive streaming services 
currently enjoy a congressionally established compulsory license, provided 
that the service complies with the Copyright Act’s requirements.128 There-
fore, sound recording copyright holders are essentially required to grant a 
license to any qualifying noninteractive webcaster to stream sound record-
ings to the public for an established rate.129  
1.  Effects of the DMCA 
Based upon the current tripartite structure of the DMCA, it is extremely 
advantageous for an Internet radio provider to qualify for the noninteractive 
webcasting compulsory license and forego the high transaction costs of 
negotiating directly with sound recording copyright owners for the right to 
offer music to consumers.130 There are a few interactive webcasters, such as 
Rhapsody131 and Spotify,132 that have had relative success under the current 
digital performance right framework. However, the vast majority of popular 
 
127 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(A). Interactive services are generally not granted licenses 
through these voluntary negotiations for a period in excess of twelve months.  
128 See id. § 114(j)(13) (prohibiting noninteractive webcasters from transmitting more than 
three songs from the same album or four songs by the same artist in any three-hour period).  
129 See id. § 114(g)(2) (describing how an agent distributes license receipts). 
130 Transaction costs include negotiation costs associated with voluntary transactions between 
copyright owners and potential users, search costs associated with buyers and sellers finding each 
other in order to initiate negotiations, information costs associated with learning about products 
and the needs of certain businesses, decision costs associated with ensuring that one enters into the 
most beneficial bargains, policing costs associated with ensuring proper compliance with 
agreements, and enforcement costs associated with parties filing lawsuits to enforce their rights 
and contracts. See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 399-400 (explaining in detail the advantages of 
certain statutory license schemes in the context of copyright). 
131 See Janko Roettgers, Rhapsody to Launch Music Subscriptions in 16 European Countries This 
Spring, GIGAOM (Jan. 10, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/01/10/rhapsody-europe-expansion 
(“Rhapsody has been the longest-running music subscription service in the U.S., and has more 
than one million subscribers. The company was seemingly caught by surprise by Spotify’s quick 
ascent, but has in recent months fought back with a number of new apps and features.”). 
132 Rhapsody is the most popular interactive, or “on-demand,” service that currently exists. 
See About Us, RHAPSODY, http://www.rhapsody.com/about/index.html (last visited May 6, 2013) 
(“Rhapsody is the number-one premium subscription service, with more than one million 
members . . . .”). It is an interactive webcasting service that charges consumers a monthly 
subscription fee for access to a music library containing over 16 million songs. Id. Spotify, 
however, has quickly gained a strong foothold and large user base in the United States since its 
launch in 2001. See Spotify Reaches One Million Subscribers, SPOTIFY (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www. 
spotify.com/us/blog/archives/category/spotify (describing the milestone of hitting one million 
subscribers); see also Robert Andrews, Spotify’s Progress: Challenging Rhapsody but Freemium Gap 
Growing, PAIDCONTENT (Dec. 6, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/12/06/spotifys-
progress-challenging-rhapsody-but-freemium-gap-growing (“Whilst Spotify gives limited free 
nonmobile access to nonpayers, Rhapsody requires payment from the outset . . . .”).  
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music services offered to the general public today are noninteractive,133 due 
to the lower royalty rates owed to copyright owners and the presence of 
compulsory licensing for noninteractive webcasters. Creating a successful 
interactive webcasting service is not impossible under the current frame-
work, but the increased costs associated with direct negotiations and the 
need to acquire streaming rights from a wide variety of copyright owners 
means that only a small number of entities are even capable of pursuing 
such a business plan.134 
The definition of interactivity, however, is not limited to only the most 
clear-cut “on-demand” services that allow users to select specific songs to 
listen to at any time.135 The DMCA amendments broadened the definition 
of an “interactive service” to include the phrase “enables a member of the 
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the 
recipient.”136 Therefore, under this revised provision, interactive webcasting 
also includes a variety of services where the degree of choice offered to 
consumers, and a music listener’s ability to shape the service to his or her 
preferences, crosses a hazy line defining what is too much predictability or 
personalized control.137  
Specifically, the legislative history of the DMCA makes clear that “audio-
on-demand,” “pay-per-listen,” and “celestial jukebox” services all fall under 
 
133 Pandora is the most dominant noninteractive webcaster in the market today. See Trefis 
Team, Pandora Still Pricey, Even with 125 Million Users, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2012, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/02/02/pandora-still-pricey-even-
with-125-million-users/ (announcing that Pandora exceeded 125 million registered users). 
However, new noninteractive webcasting services, such as Turntable.fm, have begun to garner high 
praise for their innovative forms of music delivery. See Adrianne Jeffries, What Is This Magical 
Turntable . fm Ever yone ’s  Ta lk ing About? ,  BETABEAT (June 10,  2011 ,  9:50 AM),  
http://www.betabeat.com/2011/06/what-is-this-magical-turntable-fm-everyones-talking-about 
(describing the appeal of Turntable.fm). 
134 For example, Music Unlimited is one of the more recent interactive webcasters to hit the 
market, providing over 10 million songs to consumers for a monthly subscription fee of $9.99. See 
generally MUSIC UNLIMITED, https://music.sonyentertainmentnetwork.com (last visited May 6, 
2013). Sony Entertainment, the entity offering this service, is one of the more powerful organiza-
tions within the entertainment industry and is one of the four major record labels. This interactive 
webcasting service can be provided to consumers at an affordable rate due to the company’s 
ownership of sound recording copyrights, extensive industry connections, attractive distribution 
capabilities, and powerful brand image. 
135 See Lane, supra note 66, at 466 (discussing the statutory classification of interactivity 
under the DMCA). 
136 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (2009); see also Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1522 (“[T]he DMCA 
recognized that on-demand streaming was not the only type of transmission that could hurt record 
sales.”). 
137 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 87-88 (1998) (outlining the factors that may classify a 
service as interactive). 
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the category of interactive services.138 For example, a service can qualify as 
interactive even if the consumer selects certain artists, rather than specific 
songs, that become the basis for a personalized webcast or stream.139 Essen-
tially, an interactive service can best be determined by looking at whether a 
user is “permitted to select particular sound recordings in a prerecorded or 
predetermined program.”140 However, the DMCA’s legislative history does 
not clearly outline what kinds of services are not deemed interactive under § 
114(j)(7) or where the line should be drawn.141  
The definition of interactivity thus has been the subject of important 
litigation in recent years.142 Determinations of interactivity are made today 
on a case-by-case basis. As a result, substantial and important resources are 
continually squandered as sound recording copyright holders and digital 
music providers attempt to find and stretch the boundaries of how much 
control users can be given in their consumption of music without crossing 
the line from noninteractive to interactive.143 Meanwhile, sound recording 
copyright owners continue to challenge online music services through 
increasingly expensive litigation measures.144 Even though noninteractive 
webcasters are still required to pay copyright owners and performance 
artists royalties under the noninteractive compulsory license rate, it is not 
surprising that record labels continue to fight innovative and successful 
noninteractive webcasters like Pandora because of the belief that Internet 
radio consumers “will choose to listen to webcasts and forego purchasing 
[CDs or digital albums].”145 While these services will still provide copyright 
holders with some compensation, record labels have recognized that the 
 
138 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 25 (1995). 
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 105796, at 87.  
140 Id. at 88. 
141 See Pals, supra note 84, at 684 (criticizing the way in which Congress has defined interactivity). 
142 See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(determining that a highly customizable webcasting service was noninteractive). 
143 See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1516 n.10 (claiming that Pandora is an example of a digital 
audio transmission service that falls in the gray area between clear interactive and noninteractive 
services). 
144 See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, Digital Music Service Grooveshark Sued by EMI, REUTERS 
(Jan. 5, 2012, 10:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/06/us-grooveshark-emi-lawsuit-
idUSTRE80501S20120106 (“Grooveshark has been sued by the large record company EMI Group 
Ltd, which accused the popular digital music service of paying no royalties since entering a 
licensing agreement to stream music nearly three years ago.”). 
145 Lane, supra note 67, at 471; see also Hardman, supra note 10, at 306 (predicting that 
webcasting services may be driven out of the market due to escalating litigation costs). 
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royalty fees from noninteractive webcasters are not enough to overcome the 
effects of piracy.146  
2.  The Uncertainty and Dangers Facing Webcasters 
Under the case-by-case approach adopted by the Copyright Office and 
federal courts, it is uncertain whether services using algorithms will continue 
to be considered noninteractive under the three-tiered DMCA system.147 
Given the current lack of a compulsory licensing rate for interactive services, 
such individualized factual determinations and the uncertainty surrounding 
potential high-stakes litigation can inevitably lead to services having to shut 
their doors.148  
If future courts interpret interactivity in a slightly different manner, 
many webcasters will be forced to pay higher rates to sound recording 
copyright owners and suffer the substantial transaction costs associated with 
direct negotiations.149 Smaller webcasters with less bargaining power will 
suffer by being forced to negotiate directly with copyright holders in a 
manner that may be “prohibitively expensive or even impossible.”150 High 
transaction costs are involved with direct negotiations, as users of copy-
righted works must seek out the copyright owner, ensure that others do not 
have claims to such works, and initiate such transactions from a relatively 
weak bargaining position. Even worse, while copyright owners of musical 
works have utilized collective rights organizations such as the American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (BMI) to ensure that beneficial market transactions occur as 
efficiently as possible,151 sound recording copyright owners do not have such 
 
146 See Masur, supra note 8, at 57-58 (explaining that many believe “that with the cloud of 
litigation eliminated, file-sharing networks would rapidly improve[,] . . . [and] the vast 
majority of file sharers would be willing to pay a reasonable fee for the freedom and peace of mind 
to download whatever they like using whatever software suits them” (footnote omitted)). 
147 See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1530 (arguing that questionable services should be classi-
fied as interactive in future litigation). 
148 For example, in Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009), the 
webcasting company that provided the LAUNCHcast service to consumers chose to cease making 
the service available even prior to the final court determination.  
149 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 305 (explaining that the current regime fosters uncertainty 
regarding whether Internet radio websites are safe from lawsuits, and arguing that this uncertainty 
can have potential chilling effects). 
150 Lane, supra note 66, at 473; see also Pals, supra note 84, at 687 (“For many webcasters, 
negotiating licenses from all sound recording copyright holders individually would be prohibitively 
expensive and difficult.”). 
151 See William Henslee, What’s Wrong with U.S.?: Why the United States Should Have a Public 
Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 739, 753 (2011) (explaining 
that collective rights organizations arose in response to the practical problems individual copyright 
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collective rights organizations in place to help streamline direct negotiations 
in the world of webcasting.152  
As a result, future webcasting companies may stop pushing the boundaries 
of interactivity and simply pursue noninnovative, noninteractive webcasting 
forms. Internet radio broadcasters may face negotiating costs that are so 
high that they cannot provide highly customizable webcasting to online 
music listeners at affordable rates. Recording artists and record labels will 
inevitably suffer as legal personalized services become more expensive for 
consumers to access; music listeners will recognize the increased costs and 
turn to the many convenient and available forms of pirated music services 
available on the Internet today.153 Thus, in order to ensure that the record-
ing industry enjoys rising revenues and profits in the future, a solution is 
needed that effectively aligns the interests of sound recording owners, 
distributors, and users.  
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONINTERACTIVE  
WEBCASTING ROYALTY RATE  
In order to propose an efficient solution to the problems and uncertainty 
facing the music industry today, it is important to understand the mistakes 
that have been made in relation to the establishment of the compulsory 
licensing rate for eligible and qualifying noninteractive webcasters. 
Since the first recognition of a limited sound recording performance 
right in 1995, webcasters have suffered from a severe imbalance in negotiating 
power between themselves and record labels.154 Normally under the Copy-
right Act, individuals must directly negotiate with copyright owners to 
obtain licenses in such works. However, in several instances, the Copyright 
 
owners faced in policing use of their works and collecting the royalties that they were entitled to); 
see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979) (holding that ASCAP 
and BMI do not violate antitrust laws, despite price fixing behavior, because of the superior 
efficiency such organizations provide). 
152 See Henslee, supra note 151, at 758 (explaining that the major collective rights organiza-
tions only collect and distribute royalties to songwriters and owners of publishing rights, not the 
performing artist); see also Hardman, supra note 10, at 296-97 (discussing the advantages of 
collective rights organizations and the benefits that they can provide from an economic stand-
point). Since almost 85% of artists are represented by the three major record labels, there is, in 
some sense, a form of collective bargaining that occurs when services wish to acquire the rights to 
entire catalogues of music. 
153 See also Welsh, supra note 9, at 1508-09 (explaining that standard record label contracts 
often provide recording artists with little or no revenue from the sale of records and that 
consumers seek alternatives as a result). 
154 See Day, supra note 48, at 191 (describing the years following the passage of the DPRSRA 
as an “uphill battle” for both webcasters and copyright owners). 
  
2013] Music Piracy and Diminishing Revenues 2127 
 
Act supersedes copyright law’s reliance upon market mechanisms and 
private bargaining by establishing compulsory licenses.155 Of particular 
relevance to this Comment is the compulsory license established under 17 
U.S.C. § 114, which, as previously explained, only applies to certain opera-
tors of noninteractive digital transmission services.  
Compulsory licensing, and the preemption of a copyright owner’s control 
over the use of his or her work, is primarily justified on economic grounds. 
These licenses benefit owners and users by reducing the high transaction 
costs associated with private license bargaining. In fact, transaction costs can 
reach a level so high that beneficial and utility-increasing negotiations will 
not take place at all; this can result in market failures that have the potential 
to impoverish copyright owners, desired users, and consumers at the same 
time.156 Ideally, a proper statutory licensing scheme will increase net 
revenues for both users and creators of copyrighted works, which will 
facilitate the circulation of these works to the public. The establishment of a 
satisfactory and workable royalty rate, however, is anything but easy, and 
often results in bitter disputes and lengthy legal proceedings.  
Today, compulsory licenses for sound recordings under § 114 are adminis-
tered by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), which is comprised of 
specialized judges that are appointed by the Library of Congress.157 Yet the 
establishment of the current compulsory license for noninteractive 
webcasters may have been the longest and most bitterly battled of all the 
compulsory licenses established under the Copyright Act. 
A.  Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel Proceedings  
The DMCA amendments to § 114 of the Copyright Act initially 
attempted to establish the compulsory licensing rate by providing for a 
voluntary negotiation period within which copyright holders and webcasters 
 
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2006) (establishing a statutory license in secondary transmissions 
by cable television systems); id. § 112(e) (establishing a statutory license for ephemeral recordings 
used to facilitate digital transmissions); id. § 115(a) (allowing for the reproduction and distribu-
tion of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works, including authorized digital phonorecord 
delivery of such musical works); id. § 118(b)(4) (permitting the use of certain copyrighted works 
by noncommercial broadcasting entities); id. § 119(a)(1) (allowing satellite retransmissions to the 
public for private viewing); id. § 122(a) (establishing a statutory license for satellite retransmis-
sions of local television stations’ broadcasts into the local markets).  
156 See Antonio Cordella, Does Information Technology Always Lead to Lower Transaction Costs?, 
Global Cooperation in the New Millennium 855 (The 9th European Conference on Information 
Systems, June 27, 2001), available at http://is2.lse.ac.uk/asp/aspecis/20010024.pdf (“IT is a powerful 
tool to support the economic system because it makes more information available so that the 
uncertainty faced is reduced and hence the transaction costs are lowered.”). 
157 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2009) (describing the licensing process). 
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could set the binding rate through market mechanisms.158 Only if these 
negotiations broke down would the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel 
(CARP) utilize its congressionally vested arbitration power to “establish 
rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would 
have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and 
seller.”159 CARPs were established in 1993 through the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal Reform Act, which eliminated the Copyright Royalty Tribunal 
(CRT)—the body that had been in place to administer compulsory licenses 
since the 1976 Copyright Act.160 Therefore, in 1999, when voluntary negotia-
tions broke down between webcasters and the RIAA, which represented the 
major record labels and had been vested with the power to collectively 
bargain on behalf of sound recording copyright owners, CARP proceedings 
were utilized for the first time in relation to sound recordings.161 
CARP established the compulsory license for certain digital sound recording 
transmissions in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
establishing acceptable rates, while shifting the costs of administering such 
statutory licenses to copyright owners and users.162 Webcasters were required 
to pay royalties on a per-performance basis, at a rate of seven-hundredths of 
a cent per performance for commercial webcasters and a lower rate of two-
hundredths of a cent per performance for noncommercial webcasters.163 In 
other words, the webcaster was required to pay these amounts to the 
relevant sound recording copyright owner each and every time a song was 
played.164  
 
158 See Day, supra note 48, at 188-91 (providing a detailed history of the compulsory licensing 
rate proceedings). 
159 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B); see also Duvall, supra note 11, at 272 (“The rates and terms set by 
the CARP were to distinguish among the different types of services and the degree to which the 
use of the service increased or decreased the purchases of physical phonorecords (CDs, tapes) by 
consumers.”). 
160 Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (1993). 
161 See Day, supra note 48, at 188. 
162 See Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three “Golden Oldies”: Property Rights, 
Contracts, and Markets, THE CATO INSTITUTE, Policy Analysis No. 508 (Jan. 15, 2004) 1, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1366 (“Compulsory licensing seems to 
pay off big in the short term by reducing the need for individual buyers to locate, negotiate with, 
and pay individual sellers. Compulsory licensing supposedly addresses the ‘market failure’ of high 
transaction costs.”). 
163 See In re Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording & Ephemeral 
Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA 1 & 2 (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www. 
copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.pdf (upheld by the Librarian of Congress on review). 
164 These rates were heavily based upon the recent private agreement between the RIAA and 
Yahoo!, which was believed to represent a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer 
and seller. For more information, see Duvall, supra note 11, at 274. 
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These rates, however, garnered extreme opposition and forced many 
smaller streaming services out of business.165 Though the rates were based 
on a voluntary market transaction between Yahoo! and the RIAA, smaller 
webcasters did not have the same business structure, capabilities, or 
resources as Yahoo!, and thus they were subjected to royalty rates that they 
could not pay while still making a profit. As a result, a wide variety of 
webcasters began to lobby Congress for assistance, arguing that CARP’s 
decision threatened the viability of the webcasting industry as a whole.166  
Accordingly, Congress quickly passed the Small Webcaster Settlement 
Act of 2002, which authorized SoundExchange167 to collectively bargain and 
enter into agreements with webcasters on behalf of all sound recording 
copyright owners and performers.168 With additional time to negotiate, a 
compromise between SoundExchange and commercial webcasters was 
reached in December 2002.169 An acceptable rate based upon a percent-
age of the webcaster’s total revenue, rather than a per-performance 
structure, was established.170  
Not only did this legislative compromise quell the objections of 
webcasters by creating a system based upon percentages of revenue, but also 
it satisfied recording artists because of the way in which royalty fees would 
be distributed.171 As long as the statutory requirements were satisfied and a 
service remained noninteractive, the established royalties would be collected 
 
165 See Day, supra note 48, at 188 (explaining that there was an extreme backlash after the 
CARP royalty rates were announced). 
166 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 275 (explaining that “[m]any webcasters staged a ‘Day of 
Silence’ to protest the new fees and accounting procedures”). 
167 SoundExchange is a nonprofit collective rights organization established by Congress as 
the sole entity responsible for the administration, collection, and dispersal of sound recording 
royalties to artists who register. For a more detailed discussion of SoundExchange’s history and 
responsibilities, see Masur, supra note 8, at 48. 
168 See generally Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 
(codified as amended throughout the Copyright Act). 
169 See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 
Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,511 (Dec. 24, 2002) (maintaining a flat annual fee for noncommercial 
webcasters while establishing a royalty rate for commercial webcasters between eight and twelve 
percent of revenue from 1998 to 2004). 
170 See Kellen Myers, Note, The RIAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Call for 
Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 431, 448 (2009) (detailing the specific 
percentages of revenue and flat fees to be paid under the agreement). 
171 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 277 (explaining that there were many benefits provided by the 
Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002 as compared to the CARP royalty rates). But see 
Hardman, supra note 10, at 296 (explaining that record labels prefer direct negotiations because the 
current statutory license scheme demands that up to fifty percent of royalties be given to 
performing artists). 
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from webcasters by SoundExchange.172 After collecting payments from 
webcasters, SoundExchange would distribute fifty percent of the royalties 
to the sound recording copyright holder, forty-five percent of the royalties 
to the recording artist performing the digital sound recordings, and the 
remaining five percent of the royalties to the collective agencies for nonfea-
tured musicians and vocalists.173 Though the specific terms of this compro-
mise were not precedential, Congress effectively delegated negotiating 
power to SoundExchange to set an industry-wide rate for all copyright 
holders and recording artists. This ensured that royalties were collected as 
efficiently as possible.174 
B.  The CRB Proceedings 
As was the case with the CRT proceedings, however, CARP proceedings 
were criticized as too lengthy and expensive.175 Not only were decisions 
unpredictable and inconsistent, but also they had been found to occasionally 
threaten the survival of participants on one side of the dispute.176 In fact, 
many Internet radio stations ended their streams after learning how burden-
some and expensive it would be to pay sound recording royalties in addition 
to the compulsory licensing rate required for songwriters and composers.177 
Therefore, in 2004, Congress enacted the Copyright Royalty and Distribution 
Reform Act, which permitted the Librarian of Congress to appoint three 
full-time Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) to the newly formed CRB.178 
 
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2006) (vesting the organization with such responsibilities); see 
also About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about (last visited May 6, 2013) 
(providing background information on the collective agency). 
173 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(A)-(D) (establishing the specific formula for royalty payments). 
174 See The Numbers, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://soundexchange.com/about/the-numbers 
(last visited May 6, 2013) (stating that the organization has distributed over $1 billion in royalties); 
see also Mary LaFrance, From Whether to How: The Challenge of Implementing a Full Public Perfor-
mance Right in Sound Recordings, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 221, 225 (2011) (revealing that 
SoundExchange has also entered into reciprocal agreements with collective rights organizations in 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Brazil, Spain, and Mexico to collect royalties owed to U.S. 
copyright owners); Myers & Howard, supra note 35, at 240 (explaining that royalty payments to 
the record industry are continuing to rise, even as music sales continue to decline). But see Day, 
supra note 48, at 198 (estimating that over $600 million in royalties have gone uncollected because 
of international reciprocity requirements). 
175 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 18 (2004) (explaining that CARP arbitrators were unable 
to render acceptable decisions due to a lack of expertise).  
176 See id. (criticizing the rate determinations because they “frequently reflect either a ‘con-
tent’ or ‘user’ bias”).  
177 See Myers, supra note 170, at 449 (explaining that WebRock.net, CyberRadio2000, and 
Clear Channel all stopped broadcasts of their stations following the agreement). 
178 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 
2341, 2341 (codified as amended throughout the Copyright Act). 
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Importantly, one of the main objectives of the CRB was to “maximize the 
availability of creative works to the public.”179 
The initial intention of the new proceedings was to set a royalty rate for 
sound recordings through voluntary negotiation.180 Webcasters and record 
labels, however, were yet again unable to agree upon an acceptable rate. 
Therefore, on May 1, 2007, the CRB established the royalty rate for the 
2006–2010 licensing period by once again utilizing the “willing buyer and 
seller” model.181 Employing the calculation procedures commonly used in 
voluntary transactions between interactive webcasters and record labels, the 
CRB chose to require noninteractive webcasters to pay on a per-
performance basis at an escalating rate ranging from eight-hundredths of a 
cent in 2006 to nineteen-hundredths of a cent in 2010.182  
Despite the newly formed CRB’s methodology, almost every digital 
sound recording broadcaster voiced fierce opposition.183 Both large and 
small webcasters alike predicted that the CRB rates would result in the 
demise of Internet radio and force almost every webcaster out of business.184 
 
179 See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 801(a)-(b) (2004). Other stated objectives included balancing the 
interests of the copyright owner and user and minimizing disruptions of current industry practices 
and business models. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 802. 
180 See Day, supra note 48, at 189-90 (discussing in detail the progression of the first CRB 
rate-setting procedures). 
181 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Final 
Rule and Order, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) (upheld on 
appeal in Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 571 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); 
see also Cassondra C. Anderson, Note, “We Can Work It Out:” A Chance to Level the Playing Field for 
Radio Broadcasters, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 72, 79 (2010) (“CRB judges look only at the perceived 
economic value of the sound recording when making their decision. . . . [T]hey are not concerned 
with balancing the competing considerations of charging a fair rate against providing goods to the 
public.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
182 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 24,084. 
183 See Day, supra note 48, at 190 (describing the hostile reaction as “immediate and dra-
matic”). 
184 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 280-81 (“Smaller webcasters, like Bill Goldsmith from Radio 
Paradise, were facing bills of up to 125 percent of their yearly income . . . .”); Stephenson, supra 
note 16, at 403 (“The mood of webcasters was summed up by [the CEO] of Pandora . . . in his 
statement that he was ‘not aware of any Internet radio service that believes they can sustain a 
business at the rates set by [the CRB’s] decision.’” (citing Louis Hau, Will Web Radio Get Turned Off?, 
FORBES, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/06/radio-internet-ruling-tech-cx_lh_0307radio 
.html)); Tim Westergren, RIAA’s New Royalty Rates Will Kill Online Radio!!, PA N DO R A (Mar. 6, 
2007, 12:49 AM), http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/archives/2007/03/riaas-new-royal.html 
(“The RIAA has effectively convinced [the CRB] to establish rates that make online radio a 
nonviable business.”). Some larger webcasters estimated that under the 2006–2010 compulsory 
licensing rates, they would be required to pay between 50% and 70% of annual revenues in sound 
recording performance royalties alone. See Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 4789 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
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Thus, it seemed evident that the CRB once again disfavored the interests of 
webcasters in the arbitration proceedings,185 which would threaten the 
survival of Internet radio and, in the process, a valuable form of revenue for 
the recording industry.186 
In light of this opposition, Congress swiftly enacted the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2008, permitting further negotiations between the Digital 
Media Association (DiMA), which represented webcasters,187 and 
SoundExchange.188 After negotiations reached a stalemate, 
SoundExchange finally entered into an agreement with three individual 
webcasters, which established acceptable royalty rates through 2015.189 
Other noninteractive commercial webcasters were permitted to opt in to the 
terms of the agreement should they choose to do so.190 For the most part, 
webcasters who opted in to the agreement paid the standard rate of twenty-
five percent of annual revenue in royalties.191  
The July 2009 agreement serves as the most recent example of the pref-
erence for a percentage of revenue scheme, rather than a per-performance 
fee, to ensure that webcasters are not forced to pay royalties in excess of 
 
160 (2008) (statement of Pandora representatives); Duvall, supra note 11, at 281 (explaining that 
“larger webcasters like Pandora . . . could have a royalty bill of $2 billion just for one year”); see also 
Myers, supra note 170, at 451 (explaining that the CRB royalty rate would make webcasters pay 
between 50 and 1000 % of their total annual revenue). 
185 See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 407 (“As a unified voice for copyright owners, 
SoundExchange is able to present a more forceful message of its needs and requirements before 
the Copyright Royalty Board. Copyright users, however, have divergent interests that dilute their 
message before the Board.”). 
186 See Myers, supra note 170, at 444 (providing an example where fractional differences in 
the royalty rate can equate to millions of dollars in extra costs or revenues per year); Stephenson, 
supra note 16, at 399 (“The large volume of musical performances used by webcasters results in a 
situation where fractions of a cent per performance may make the difference between the viability 
of a commercial webcaster or its demise.” (footnote omitted)); see also Day, supra note 14, at 75-76 
(explaining that record labels and their investments provide a “ripple effect” across the economy 
by purchasing services from others involved in the music industry and buying advertising space 
from a variety of media companies). But see Duvall, supra note 11, at 279 (setting forth reasons why 
the CRB chose a per-performance rate rather than a revenue-based rate). 
187 See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 398 (explaining that DiMA is an organization focused 
upon promoting and ensuring “business model innovation for commercial webcasters”). 
188 See generally The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 
(codified as amended throughout the Copyright Act). 
189 See Dan Wilson, Internet Radio Agreement Reached Between SoundExchange and Webcasters, 
BEST SYNDICATION (July 7, 2009), http://www.bestsyndication.com/?q=20090707_ 
soundexchange_music_rights_pandora.htm (explaining that the agreement permitted payment of a 
discounted CRB-based per-song rate or twenty-five percent of annual revenue). 
190 See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1527 (clarifying that essentially all webcasters, by opting 
in, could pay “the greater of twenty-five percent of gross revenues or a per-play rate that is heavily 
discounted from the default CRB per-play rate”). 
191 See id. (explaining that there was a clear preference for the revenue-based option). 
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yearly revenue.192 After all, if webcasters are unable to provide their services 
to consumers due to escalating costs that outpace revenue, the statutorily 
established compulsory license provides sound recording copyright owners 
with less revenue than they would receive with these services in business.193  
However, on January 5, 2011, the CRB once again convened and issued 
the current compulsory licensing rate for eligible and qualifying noninter-
active webcasters,194 which once again opted for a purely per-
performance compulsory fee when setting the 2011 to 2015 royalty rates.195 
As commentators have noted, “[s]ince both the CRB’s rates and the negoti-
ated agreements terminate in 2015, the high statutory license rates and the 
CRB’s questionable track record still loom as significant concerns for the 
future of webcasting.”196  
 
192 See id. at 1522 (explaining that this movement occurred because “the existing rate struc-
ture has been thought to already be prohibitively expensive” (footnote omitted)). 
193 This statement assumes that these noninteractive services do not significantly displace 
album sales, and thus there would not be an increase in consumer album or song purchases once 
these webcasters went out of business. 
194 See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 
76 Fed. Reg. 13,026 (Mar. 9, 2011) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
195 Id. With the July 2009 agreement in place, which extends through 2015, the CRB simply 
preferred to address the per-performance rate option included in the agreement, rather than take 
the initiative to statutorily provide for a revenue-based option that would apply to all webcasters. 
The CRB based the current per-performance rates on those already in effect for 2010, adjusting 
the figures upward by using the same escalation formula used for the 2006 to 2010 period. A 
gradual escalation was provided for each subsequent year, with 2015 requiring royalty payments 
from commercial noninteractive webcasters of $0.0025 per performance. See Kevin Goldberg, The 
Webcasters’ Next Five-Year Plan, COMMLAWBLOG (Dec. 19, 2010, 9:16 PM), http://www. 
commlawblog.com/2010/12/articles/intellectual-property/the-webcasters-next-fiveyear-
plan/ (providing a per-performance rate chart for the 2011 to 2015 period).  
196 Pals, supra note 84, at 688-89 (footnotes omitted). In response to these concerns, Pandora, 
Clear Channel, and other companies closely tied to music webcasting have founded the Internet 
Radio Fairness Coalition, “a collection of companies, trade associations and advocacy 
groups . . . that are throwing their weight behind bills that aim to lower the rates 
webcasters pay for the performance of sounds recordings.” Glenn Peoples, Pandora, Clear Channel, 
Others Form Advocacy Group for Lower Web Radio Payments; MusicFirst Pushes Back, BILLBOARD 
(Oct. 25, 2012) http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1083273/pandora-clear-channel-others-
form-advocacy-group-for-lower-web-radio. The group introduced the Internet Radio Fairness Act 
of 2012, legislation that was aimed at lowering webcaster royalties by replacing the CRB’s “willing 
buyer and willing seller” standard with the guidelines used by satellite radio and cable broadcast-
ers. Under these new guidelines, the royalty rate would be set after taking “into account the public 
interest, the return earned by copyright owners, the minimization of risk in the industry, and the 
interplay between creative contribution and capital investment.” Id.; see also Internet Radio 
Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2013). The bill, however, failed to gain the necessary 
support to be enacted and has thus been referred back to committee. See Peoples, supra (noting 
that “artists, music creators and other people wrote over 11,000 letters to Congress opposing the 
Internet Radio Fairness Act” in a single weekend). 
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In light of the tumultuous history of the § 114 compulsory license rate, it 
is imperative for Congress to recognize the superiority of a revenue-based 
system when establishing the proposed compulsory license rate for interactive 
webcasting.197 The establishment of a higher compulsory licensing rate for 
interactive webcasters as compared to noninteractive webcasters can appease 
the concerns of both copyright owners and webcasters while simultaneously 
providing consumers with a greater supply and diversity of music tailored to 
more personalized interests. Most importantly, over time, a statutorily set 
compulsory license rate for interactive webcasters will incentivize record 
labels to embrace the digital distribution of music, allow sound recording 
copyright owners to capitalize on new streams of revenue, and drastically 
decrease music piracy in the digital age.  
V.  ESTABLISHING COMPULSORY ROYALTIES FOR INTERACTIVE 
WEBCASTERS 
The history of the public performance right in sound recordings shows 
that Congress has continued to tailor legislation and rate determinations to 
the overwhelming influence and power of the record labels. By adopting a 
more holistic view of the music industry and taking into account the 
interests of copyright holders, webcasters, and consumers as a whole, 
Congress can help overcome the resistance to change that the recording 
industry has displayed in recent years.198 
A.  The Need for Revenue-Based Compulsory License Rates for All Webcasters 
The first step in the process is to recognize that the per-performance 
standard for the compulsory licensing rate established under 17 U.S.C. § 114 
for noninteractive services should be abandoned. Once Congress recognizes 
that market forces have settled on a royalty figure in the range of twenty-
five percent of annual revenue for noninteractive services, not only will 
 
197 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 291 (2008) (“The revenue-based model presumes that most 
services will survive; the current per performance rates do not.”). 
198 See Pals, supra note 84, at 690 (stating that “[t]here are times when the music industry 
seems so nervous about the new challenges that digital technology poses that it forgets to take into 
account the positive influences new technology may have on the music industry”); Perritt, supra 
note 7, at 80 (explaining that “[record labels’] business processes and fixed costs were designed to 
succeed in the environment of the last quarter of the twentieth century, but have not been adjusted 
to fit current technology” (footnote omitted)).  
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noninteractive services be ensured a promising future,199 but also a higher 
statutory rate for interactive services can easily be established as well.200  
Under per-performance rates, more popular stations and webcasting ser-
vices could face licensing fees that are “either an exorbitant percentage of or 
are greater than gross revenues.”201 As a result, Internet broadcasters may be 
forced to charge high monthly subscription fees to cover their operating 
costs. By doing so, these services risk losing their primary audience to 
illegal services that are capable of providing similar music selections and 
comparable online music services to consumers for free: “Some industry 
experts warn that if regulated webcasters are driven off the web, listeners 
are likely to turn to illegal services, which pay no royalties, or those who 
operate from overseas.”202  
A revenue-based model will ensure that licensing fees do not exceed 
gross revenues.203 Webcasting services will no longer have to waste valuable 
resources in the courts litigating the definition of interactivity, as the 
implementation of a revenue-based compulsory license rate for both 
noninteractive and interactive webcasters will eliminate the high costs and 
burdens that this issue has imposed upon all parties in recent years. Instead 
of having the courts determine whether a service is interactive or noninter-
active, the establishment of a royalty rate for interactive webcasters could 
shift the determination responsibility to the CRB.204 This specialized panel, 
 
199 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 268 (“[I]f royalty rates are set too high for all but the largest 
webcasters to stay in business, the variety of music available will be severely restricted[,] . . . [and it 
would] destroy one of the last readily accessible sources of alternative, nonmainstream music.” 
(footnote omitted)); Hardman, supra note 10, at 312-13 (explaining that the lack of a collective 
rights organization for sound recordings leads interactive webcasters to negotiate with record 
labels that own a greater number of copyrights and more mainstream music because transaction 
costs are lower with such owners).  
200 See Mike King, How Does Spotify Pay Artists? Interview with Spotify’s D.A. Wallach, BERK-
LEEMUSIC (Sept. 4, 2012), http://mikeking.berkleemusicblogs.com/2012/09/04/how-does-spotify-
pay-artists-interview-with-spotify%E2%80%99s-d-a-wallach (explaining that Spotify, an 
interactive webcaster that has thousands of contracts with artists and record labels, distributes 70 
% of its annual revenues to copyright owners). 
201 Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1525. For a thorough discussion of the perverse incentives per-
performance royalty rates create, see Duvall, supra note 11, at 268-70. Duvall provides detailed 
calculations based upon moderate estimates of interactive webcasting use by consumers to display 
how royalty fees can actually exceed the revenue webcasters can garner from advertising. 
202 Duvall, supra note 11, at 280 (citing Eliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, 
WIRED (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879). 
203 See, e.g., Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, 
2782 (2002) (specifying that “[a]ny such agreement for small commercial webcasters shall include 
provisions for payment of royalties on the basis of a percentage of revenue or expenses, or both”). 
204 See Hardman, supra note 10, at 313-14 (discussing the advantages of establishing an inter-
active webcaster royalty rate). 
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which has already analyzed in depth the conflicting concerns and interests 
of participants in the webcasting industry, would be able to resolve important 
disputes on a more specialized level and with less cost to the parties in-
volved.205 In the process, the chilling effect that webcasters have recently 
experienced would be drastically reduced as the CRB determinations would 
not create the high-stakes litigation that currently occurs under § 114. Under 
the new structure, the CRB “would not need to decide whether a license 
should issue—only at what price.”206 
With webcasting costs lowered, Internet broadcasters will have the ability 
to be more creative and aggressive in the formats and functions of their 
services, providing consumers with a greater variety of music and a greater 
degree of control over their musical experiences. This should generally drive 
more consumers to use webcasting, averting them from obtaining pirated 
music through illegal downloads and P2P networks. As more and more 
consumers utilize these webcasting services, advertising revenues will 
increase. Ultimately, this will lead to greater revenues for record labels, so 
long as the compulsory license rates are structured in such a way as to 
provide webcasters with the ability to pay copyright owners a pre-
determined percentage of their annual revenues.  
B.  Proposed Compulsory License Rate for Interactive Webcasters  
To establish a revenue-based compulsory license for interactive 
webcasters, Congress needs only slightly to amend the tripartite system 
established under 17 U.S.C § 114. Terrestrial radio broadcasters should 
remain exempt from compensating sound recording copyright owners for 
broadcasting their works. Additionally, noninteractive webcasters should 
continue to pay a compulsory license rate to SoundExchange, but only as a 
percentage of revenue. Finally, Congress should establish a revenue-based 
compulsory rate for interactive webcasters.  
Under this proposed structure, interactive webcasters will be permitted 
to use sound recordings without the copyright owner’s express consent. In 
recognition of the risk that interactive services might displace physical and 
digital music sales and diminish copyright owners’ abilities to control the 
distribution and performance of their works, the compulsory license rate for 
interactive services must be a higher percentage of revenue than the 
 
205 See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 395 (“Delegation is most commonly used where the 
industry sector to be regulated is highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of 
continuous decision.”); see also Hardman, supra note 10, at 313 (“Shifting the burden in this way 
from courts to the [CRB] might be a more efficient allocation of governmental resources.”). 
206 Hardman, supra note 10, at 313.  
  
2013] Music Piracy and Diminishing Revenues 2137 
 
compulsory license rate for noninteractive webcasters.207 The revenue-based 
scheme need not be the sole option for webcasting royalty rate payments, 
but webcasters should never be required to pay fees in excess of the statutorily 
set percentage of revenue. While some smaller webcasting services may 
therefore continue to privately bargain with copyright owners around the 
established royalty rate, or opt for a per-performance compensation rate, a 
default rule based upon percentages of revenue will incentivize interactive 
streaming services to reach their growth potential.  
It should be a much less challenging process for the CRB to extrapolate 
an acceptable revenue-based rate for interactive webcasters because of the 
numerous license rate negotiations between noninteractive webcasters and 
copyright owners that have taken place in the past. In fact, the CRB per-
performance royalty rates for noninteractive webcasters have always been 
primarily based upon extrapolations from the voluntary agreements entered 
into by interactive webcasters and record companies.208 Thus, much of the 
direct comparison work between interactive and noninteractive webcasters 
and the effects different services will likely have on album sales has already 
been completed during the CARP and CRB noninteractive rate proceedings.209 
The key data needed to set a higher interactive compulsory license rate has 
already been collected, including the average retail price interactive services 
charge consumers, the average royalty charged by record companies from 
these interactive webcasters, the license fee to retail price ratio of these 
services, and the effect of interactivity on demand.210 Taking all of these 
factors into account, noninteractive services that are identical to interactive 
services in all other respects should charge between fifty-three and sixty-
three percent of the retail price of the average interactive service.211  
 
207 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 132 (“Spotify pays back nearly 70% of all the money [it] 
get[s] in to rightsholders.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, to ensure as best as 
possible that interactive webcasting does not lead to increased piracy, the new compulsory license 
for interactive services should be subject to the statutory requirement that webcasters take certain 
anticopying protective measures in order to be eligible for the congressionally established 
compulsory license. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(C)(v) (2006) (requiring transmitting entities to 
cooperate in order to prevent various types of piracy).  
208 See Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1536-40 (discussing Dr. Pelcovits’s approach for extrapo-
lating noninteractive rates and the CRB’s adoption of his methodology). 
209 See id. at 1536-37 (discussing how the value of interactivity has already been isolated and 
adjustments have been made for noninteractive webcasting royalty rates). 
210 See id. (outlining the highly empirical analysis the CRB uses to set the noninteractive 
royalty rates). 
211 See Testimony of Michael Pelcovits at 39, In re Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Oct. 31, 2005) (Testimo-
ny of Michael Pelcovits), available at www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-5/soundex-pelcovits-
written.pdf (noting that “interactivity raises the price of an online music service by 60% above the 
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The CRB should begin by utilizing the 25 % of revenue figure that was 
agreed upon in July 2009 for noninteractive services. It can then extrapolate 
from this figure using the same methodology accepted and utilized by the 
CRB previously. After the two staggered revenue-based compulsory license 
rates are established, SoundExchange can best collect the fees that interac-
tive webcasters would pay under § 114. SoundExchange would be better able 
to monitor and collect royalties from webcasting services and end users, and 
then distribute the proper percentage of the total royalty payments to 
performing artists and record labels based upon airplay. This will ensure 
that the most popular artists, or holders of the most valuable copyrights, 
will be compensated the most for their creation of such beneficial works.212 
Yet, the same incentives will be given to all artists and record labels, encour-
aging them to strive for widespread success and popularity since copyright 
owners and recording artists will only be compensated through 
SoundExchange if their music is played on these services.213 
In order to benefit from the efficiencies of SoundExchange, performing 
artists and record labels should be required to register with the organization. 
SoundExchange would maintain a database to identify producers, performers, 
and copyright owners and their contact information to ensure the proper 
distribution of royalties. Technologies already exist that allow digital files to 
be embedded with identifying and contact information for rights holders.214 
Thus, each song’s total airplay, or number of performances, would be 
relatively easy for music services to track and report to SoundExchange.  
It is imperative, however, that this database and embedded identifying 
information be made available not only to SoundExchange, but also to 
record labels and performing artists. This would ensure that royalties are 
fully collected and distributed to the proper parties.215 Royalties that are 
 
level of a noninteractive service that is identical in every other respect”); see also Hoffman, supra 
note 122, at 1544 (arguing that statutory rates should be adjusted based on the customizability of 
the digital broadcast service); Myers & Howard, supra note 35, at 240 (explaining that the history 
of the sound recording public performance right has already established a framework for 
determining reasonable royalty rates by the CRB and SoundExchange and for collecting, 
monitoring, and dispersing these fees effectively and easily). 
212 See King, supra note 200 (“On an individual artist level, we’re paying out royalties of $200-
300 thousand dollars a month for some of the biggest acts.”); see also id. (“If we can get to the scale 
of Netflix—which has 20 million subscribers—we estimate we’d be paying out to artists what 
iTunes is paying out on a year to year basis.”). 
213 See Andrews, supra note 132 (explaining that Spotify has “paid out more than $500 million 
[in royalties to rights holders] and it’s more than doubled in the last nine months”). 
214 See LaFrance, supra note 174, at 259 (“Tracking usage of specific recordings is relatively 
easy because the necessary information is encoded in the digital recordings.”). 
215 See id. at 256 (suggesting that SoundExchange follow a similar structure to ensure proper 
collection and dispersal of sound recording royalties). 
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incapable of being distributed to copyright owners or performing artists—
possibly because registration has not been completed or ownership of the 
relevant copyright has been transferred without updating the database 
information—would be held and made available to be claimed for a certain 
sufficient period of time (i.e., five years). Any unclaimed funds, in addition 
to a small percentage of total royalties collected, would then be used by 
SoundExchange to cover the costs of administering the system as well as 
monitoring, collecting, and dispersing royalties.216 This distribution scheme 
would thus capitalize on the lower costs and greater enforceability that 
collective rights organizations can provide to copyright owners.  
The details of such a plan will undoubtedly be the subject of fierce and 
lengthy bargaining between sound recording copyright owners and desired 
users. However, Congress and the recording industry should begin to 
recognize the power and importance of streaming technology in today’s 
world. The first step in that process is for Congress to amend the Copyright 
Act to create a compulsory license for interactive webcasters. By eliminating 
the need for interactive webcasters to directly negotiate with sound recording 
copyright owners, the high transaction costs that stunt the growth of the 
interactive webcasting industry will be curtailed. Valuable resources will no 
longer have to be expended in order to obtain the rights to publicly perform 
sound recordings, and the search process will be streamlined as 
SoundExchange will collectively govern the rights of all sound recording 
copyright owners in the digital world. While it may take many years to 
establish an interactive webcasting royalty rate that properly compensates 
copyright owners while still allowing Internet services and webcasting 
companies to expand or develop highly profitable business plans, the 
experience the music industry has gained from the establishment of the 
noninteractive webcasting royalty rate should expedite the process.  
C.  The Benefits of Amending § 114 as Compared to Other Proposals  
Over the last fifteen years, scholars and commentators have suggested 
both traditional and novel solutions to combat diminishing record label 
revenues and the music piracy epidemic. Some of these suggested solutions 
have been and continue to be pursued through the courts and Congress, 
while others have been overwhelmingly resisted or rejected. This Comment 
does not argue that establishing a compulsory license rate for interactive 
webcasters will be the sole solution to all of the music industry’s problems. 
 
216 See id. at 256-59 (discussing ways that relevant copyright owners can be encouraged to 
register with SoundExchange and properly protect their rights). 
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In order to ensure the health and profitability of the industry in the future, 
many changes and sacrifices must be made by all market participants 
involved. Instead, this Comment proposes that the entire music industry 
needs to be incentivized to follow a different and modernized path in order 
to ensure long-term success and growth. Before discussing in greater detail 
the breadth of benefits that would accrue to copyright owners, webcasters, 
and consumers from this Comment’s proposed statutory changes, I highlight 
a few of the more recent and promising proposals in order to shed light on 
the superior value and benefits compulsory licensing can provide.  
Recently, it has been suggested that the music industry embrace a Hulu-
like model217 in an attempt to combat diminishing profits.218 By focusing 
upon partnerships with online intermediaries that can offer free streaming 
and downloading services to consumers, these online distribution services 
would gain the majority of their profits through advertising.219 An escalating 
revenue stream based upon increasing levels of consumer use would thus 
result.220 Meanwhile, by embracing a new distribution system that is more 
in line with consumer preferences, record labels and other copyright owners 
would increase their annual profits.221  
While this solution properly recognizes the need for the music industry 
to embrace streaming technology and promising new delivery methods, the 
history of the DPRSRA suggests that voluntary negotiations between 
record labels and online providers would take decades to complete. In order 
to overcome the high transaction costs that might hinder such negotiations 
and to ensure the health and growth of the music industry, Congress should 
take the initiative to amend the Copyright Act. A more comprehensive 
statutory licensing scheme will adequately address the complexity of 
Internet radio broadcasters and ensure that value can be derived from all of 
the services offered to consumers in today’s online music industry.222  
 
217 Established as a joint venture between NBCUniversal, Fox Entertainment Group, and 
Disney-ABC Television Group, Hulu is a website that offers ad supported–on demand streaming 
video of television shows, motion pictures, and webisodes. Users can enjoy the Hulu media 
content for free, or through a monthly subscription option that provides them with more content. 
See HULU, www.hulu.com (last visited May 6, 2013). 
218 See Masur, supra note 8, at 56 (explaining that new media services like Hulu and Netflix 
have experienced extensive growth and success in the market for high quality digital content).  
219 For a more detailed discussion of this proposal, see Jessica Wang, A Brave New Step: Why 
the Music Industry Should Follow the Hulu Model, 51 IDEA 511, 531-49 (2011). 
220 Id. at 546-47 (describing potential revenue streams from the “Hulu Model”). 
221 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 294 (“Pandora gives listeners access to over 39,000 performers; 
terrestrial radio plays fewer than three hundred different artists.” (footnote omitted)). 
222 Compare Hoffman, supra note 122, at 1517 (“[T]he rate scheme should contain a finer gra-
dation of rates . . . . To only recognize the two extremes—fully interactive on one end and 
completely noninteractive on the other—is to ignore the range of the value that exists in 
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Alternatively, some scholars have suggested amending the Copyright 
Act to essentially legalize unauthorized downloading and streaming of 
music through the establishment of a federal digital music tax.223 The goal 
of this tax would be to ensure adequate compensation for sound recording 
copyright owners in the face of widespread music piracy. The tax revenue 
would be allocated to copyright owners based upon the frequency of use of 
their works as compared to other sound recordings.224 Proponents argue 
that such a system would ensure that owners of sound recordings, and 
specifically record labels, are adequately compensated, while providing 
consumers with legal, free music.225  
However, the major shortcoming of such a widespread government tax 
system is the heavy cross-subsidization that would result. Since not all 
taxpayers use or download sound recordings to the same extent, high-
volume music listeners would be subsidized by low-volume or no-volume 
music listeners.226 Some individuals today choose never to pay for music 
online, preferring the radio or their already assembled collections of CDs 
and digital albums. Consequently, a tax imposed upon these individuals in 
order to compensate record labels and other copyright owners while allowing 
copyright infringers to escape liability seems to be an unjust allocation of 
financial burdens.227 While it would be wise to adopt a system that distrib-
utes fees to copyright owners based upon the frequency of consumer use, 
individuals should not be forced to pay for services and copyrighted works 
for which they have no use or desire to engage.  
 
between.”), with Wang, supra note 219, at 531-36 (arguing that the Hulu Model is the best solution 
for the music industry). 
223 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) (arguing for a tax-based compensation system); 
see also Welsh, supra note 9, at 1497 (suggesting “an absolute privilege against copyright liability for 
noncommercial reproduction and distribution of sound recordings by individuals”). 
224 See FISHER, supra note 223, at 223-34 (discussing ways to allocate possible tax revenues to 
copyright owners). 
225 Id. at 224 (suggesting that the best system would be to allocate revenue based upon the 
frequency with which sound recordings are downloaded). 
226 See Masur, supra note 8, at 54 (stating that many opponents of the tax solution have 
pointed to the inequity in allocating costs to all users equally despite differences in levels of media 
consumption). 
227 But see id. at 45 (explaining a proposed solution that would “create a right to collect reasonable 
fees from all Internet users at their point of access”).  
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VI.  BENEFITS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR  
INTERACTIVE WEBCASTING 
It will not be easy to garner the necessary political and economic support 
to implement this Comment’s proposed changes. The recording industry 
will most likely vehemently resist the establishment of a royalty rate for 
interactive webcasters.228 Record labels and copyright owners will argue that 
they will experience drastic decreases in record and song sales from the 
imposition of such a compulsory license rate because of the greater ease of 
piracy and severe cannibalization associated with these services. However, 
by establishing a significantly higher compulsory license rate than is cur-
rently in place for noninteractive webcasters, copyright owners can be 
adequately compensated for the risks they are incurring and the potential 
shift in consumer consumption decisions. In the short-term, record label 
profits are likely to continue diminishing or remain relatively stagnant. But 
as a greater variety of webcasting services form and interactive webcasting is 
permitted to flourish under a revenue-based model that ensures the survival 
and growth of new music delivery technologies, consumers, webcasters, and 
copyright owners will all benefit.229 
While the predictability of interactive webcasting worries the recording 
industry because of the greater possibility and ease of illegal copying and 
reproduction, streaming technology and interactive webcasting provide 
several advantages over permanent download formats in today’s digital 
world. Though songs can still be copied and dispersed when streamed to a 
user’s computer, there is a greater opportunity cost for the initial infringer 
to copy streaming audio.230  
With regard to digital file downloads, an individual who wants to illegally 
copy and disperse a file to the public can do so in a matter of seconds. This 
 
228 See Robert Andrews, Interview: Spotify Exec on Royalties and Keeping Labels Happy, 
PAIDCONTENT (Dec. 10, 2012), http://paidcontent.org/2012/12/10/interview-spotify-exec-on-
royalties-and-keeping-labels-happy (noting that “major artists like Adele, Coldplay, deadmau5[,] 
Taylor Swift[,] and Rihanna have, over the last year, withheld their latest albums from streaming 
services, hoping for a downloads pay-day before a streaming long tail”). See also Ben Sisario, 
AC/DC Joins iTunes, as Spotify Emerges as Music’s New Disrupter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012, 
5:14 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/acdc-joins-itunes-as-spotify-
emerges-as-musics-new-disrupter (“The Apple iTunes store . . . won over a last holdout—
AC/DC—on Monday. But the band’s decision to join iTunes has also revealed that the industry 
has found a new digital frenemy: Spotify, where AC/DC’s music is still nowhere to be found.”). 
229 See King, supra note 200 (suggesting that, as websites such as Spotify grow, “the pool of 
revenue will increase, and the royalty rate will increase for rights holders”). 
230 See generally DAVID AUSTERBERRY, THE TECHNOLOGY OF VIDEO AND AUDIO 
STREAMING 133-40 (2d ed. 2005) (providing a detailed discussion of the technology behind and 
uses of streaming media in the digital world). 
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is because the file is permanently downloadable to the user’s computer 
desktop and a plethora of software is available to copy digital files in the 
same high quality format. Similarly, with physical albums, many forms of 
“ripping” software have been developed that allow an infringer to make 
permanent digital copies of an entire CD and automatically divide the copy 
into individual song files in a matter of seconds.231 But with a streaming 
audio recording, the music pirate must allow the entire song to play in real-
time in order to create a copy of the work. Additionally, a new file must be 
created since no permanent file is placed on the user’s computer when 
streaming a song. Therefore, the costs associated with pirating music are 
increased because in order to pirate music files, consumers must invest in 
high quality sound recording software, programs, or systems, stream the 
entire song to copy it fully, and then divide up the streaming music copies 
into individual files for dispersal to the public.232 As a result, many user-
influenced services do “not pose an unusually grave threat to copyright 
holders” when useful business models, technology, and anti-copying protec-
tions are in place because “copying from a stream is so inefficient for 
pirating specific songs that very few users would consider trying it.”233 
With the recent rise in popularity of services like Hulu and Netflix,234 it 
seems that society has embraced streaming-based services and technologies. 
This trend is likely to continue as Internet and wireless speeds increase, 
mobile devices become more sophisticated, and 4G networks provide 
greater connectivity to programs, websites, and services throughout the 
world. Companies are increasingly relying upon mobile applications and 
streaming technologies to satisfy consumer preferences and needs.235 Yet the 
recording industry has for the most part resisted such new technologies, 
fighting vigorously to maintain an outdated business model dependent on 
physical album sales. But if copyright owners of sound recordings can 
recognize the advantages of webcasting, accept statutory changes that are 
 
231 While the music industry made it harder to copy CDs and DVDs in the mid-2000s with 
the use of anti-circumvention technology, this practice has been largely abandoned due to 
consumer frustration and backlash. 
232 See AUSTERBERRY, supra note 230, at 137-38 (discussing the many benefits and valuable 
uses of streaming technology).  
233 Pals, supra note 84, at 691 (footnote omitted). 
234 See generally NETFLIX, www.netflix.com (last visited May 6, 2013). Netflix originally 
began as a successful provider of flat-rate DVD-by-mail services. In recent years, however, the 
company has steadily shifted toward an on-demand Internet-streaming media platform.  
235 See, e.g., Mobile Apps: NFL Sunday Ticket, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/ 
DTVAPP/content/technology/mobile_apps/nfl_sunday_ticket (last visited May 6, 2013) 
(announcing that with the NFL Sunday Ticket app, consumers can now watch every Sunday NFL 
football game on their smartphone or tablet). 
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more directed toward long-term growth rather than short-term profit, and 
shift the focus of the entire music industry from permanent file formats and 
physical ownership of music to streaming services, all music industry 
market participants can achieve greater benefits and profits.  
A.  Short-Term Benefits 
It is important to recognize that record labels and copyright owners will 
most likely suffer short-term losses due to the proposed changes and 
consequent rapid shift in the market. However, as companies begin to 
profitably offer more customizable and personalized services to the public, 
and consumers begin to utilize free interactive webcasting or subscription-
based services, less piracy should occur. In the long-run, while the use of 
interactive services may largely displace traditional record sales, the savings 
associated with significantly reducing the illegal downloading, copying, and 
distribution of sound recordings can more than offset these losses.236 
By establishing a revenue-based royalty rate that incentivizes interactive 
webcasters to capture as much of the market as possible, consumers will find 
it easier to obtain the music and personalized services that they overwhelm-
ingly desire. Consumers who enjoy discovering new music and being 
randomly exposed to new artists and unique genres can continue to engage 
with noninteractive services governed by a lower compulsory license rate. 
However, individuals who prefer to exercise control over their music will be 
permitted to do so in more affordable and convenient ways than ever 
before.237 Interactive webcasters will be able to offer consumers millions of 
songs through vast and relatively comprehensive music catalogues, provid-
ing users with any sound recording they could possibly desire.238  
Further, a revenue-based model would permit webcasters to focus on 
creating value and achieving sustained growth because SoundExchange 
would perform the distribution of royalties to each copyright owner. These 
webcasters would no longer have to waste resources determining which 
 
236 See Duvall, supra note 11, at 295 (concluding that having a wide variety of music available 
will ultimately benefit both society and the music industry, which can “tak[e] advantage of the 
unique aspects of webcasting to promote their products”). 
237 See King, supra note 200 (explaining, through an interview with Spotify’s “Artist in Resi-
dence,” that a yearly subscription to the service costs $120 in the United States, £120 in the United 
Kingdom, and €120 in the European Union). 
238 Robert Andrews, Spotify Solves Discovery by Discovering Music Ain’t So Social After All, 
PAIDCONTENT (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:37 PM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/12/06/spotify-solves-discovery-by-
discovering-music-aint-so-social-after-all (“Spotify is a great way to listen to 18 million tracks. 
Now it has plugged its biggest hole—discovering them.”); see also Andrews, supra, note 132 
(detailing how Spotify is “[a]dding 10,000 to 20,000 new songs every single day”).  
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songs attract the most users or what sound recordings are profitable based 
upon a certain level of use. Webcasters could instead focus on increasing the 
general demand for music, which would raise their annual revenues and 
result in greater compensation to copyright owners as a whole. In essence, 
this Comment’s proposed changes would ensure that interactive webcasters 
and record labels work as partners in a unified effort to increase the supply 
and demand of legal sound recordings, rather than bicker over the division 
of diminishing profit margins in the face of music piracy.  
B.  Long-Term Benefits 
As the music industry, the Internet, and streaming technologies continue 
to evolve, a new statutory scheme for webcasting can produce significant 
benefits. Consumers, webcasters, and record labels will hopefully be able to 
realize great gains as the music industry pie once again begins to grow with 
compulsory license rates in place for all webcasters. 
Consumers will benefit from the establishment of an interactive compul-
sory license rate for a variety of reasons. Due to lower operating costs, 
webcasters should be able to more effectively compete with the overwhelm-
ing availability of free pirated music. This is because webcasters will have 
the flexibility to structure their businesses to operate primarily on advertis-
ing revenue, which would allow consumers the option of streaming music 
for free. However, even if interactive webcasters chose to charge a low 
monthly subscription fee, for example in the range ten to fifteen dollars per 
month, the advantages associated with gaining access to such an organized 
and vast selection of music will undoubtedly be attractive to consumers. 
Subscribers will be offered a variety of genres, artists, and songs, all in 
furtherance of providing consumers with any song they could ever possibly 
desire.239 By establishing a compulsory license rate for interactive 
webcasters through a congressional amendment, an even greater repertoire 
of music can be compiled, since webcasters will only be required to pay a 
lump percentage of revenue to SoundExchange. Without having to engage 
in private negotiations or the tracking and dispersal of royalty fees to 
individual copyright owners, webcasters will be able to offer consumers any 
copyrighted musical performance they want. These lower costs will also 
likely lower the monthly fees charged by webcasters. 
Unlike illegal file sharing websites and pirated music services, interactive 
webcasters can effectively eliminate the risk of consumers being sued for 
 
239 See Johnson, supra note 69 (providing a quick look at Rhapsody’s structure and the rea-
sons for its success). 
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copyright infringement. Furthermore, since webcasting does not leave a 
permanent file on a user’s system, the harms that can result from downloading 
corrupted files will be eliminated. Technology has reached a point where 
many consumers might prefer to use streaming musical services rather than 
to own physical or digital copies of sound recordings. Due to the increasing 
speeds and availability of wireless Internet services, the creation of 4G 
networks, and the advancement of mobile devices, consumers no longer feel 
uncomfortable “renting” music.240 Interactive webcasting allows consumers 
to instantly own tens of millions of songs, so long as they are capable of 
connecting to the Internet.  
Services will be able to offer consumers access to vast libraries of music 
through a variety of devices: computers, cell phones, portable music players 
(such as iPods), and televisions, to name a few.241 It is nearly impossible to 
predict what new technologies or devices will be developed that will offer 
consumers even greater connectivity. But it is safe to say that interactive 
webcasting services have the potential to offer music listeners something 
unique and highly valuable—an unlimited capacity to store sound recordings 
and the ability to access and listen to almost any song at any time. 
Comparably, interactive webcasting services will experience drastic 
growth and will attract more lucrative opportunities under a new statutory 
scheme. They will benefit from the greater flexibility that a compulsory 
license rate can provide. As the consumer base of successful interactive 
webcasting services grows,242 web-based advertising will be in greater 
demand and will prove more profitable. Companies will be willing to pay 
higher rates for access to a greater number and wider array of potential 
customers. This will lead to greater revenues for webcasting services, 
permitting such companies to offer more creative and revolutionary services 
to consumers. More importantly, with a revenue-based royalty rate structure 
in place, webcasters will not be in danger of going bankrupt because of 
disproportionate royalty fees that could exceed their total annual revenue.  
Subscription fees should become more acceptable to consumers as 
webcasters offer greater personalization and allow consumers to amass a 
 
240 See Steve O’Hear, Music Industry: Five Alternative Business Models, LAST100 (Oct. 11, 
2007), http://www.last100.com/2007/10/11/music-industry-five-alternative-business-models (citing 
legendary music producer Rick Rubin and predicting that “[w]hen all of our music can ‘live in the 
clouds’,[sic] accessible at any time, owning it outright may no longer be that important”). 
241 See Andrews, supra note 132 (noting that just after one year, Spotify had more than twenty 
million active users who created more than one billion playlists, and over one million songs were 
streamed in just the first week after the company launched its mobile application).  
242 See King, supra note 200 (predicting that “subscription based interactive streaming mod-
el[s] will likely continue to play a growing part in the future of music consumption”). 
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seemingly limitless library of sound recordings. As a result, the most 
successful and efficient webcasters will be able to profitably charge a low 
monthly fee that will bolster total revenue.243 As interactive webcasting 
evolves and is able to offer consumers benefits that P2P networks and 
pirated music cannot provide—such as more efficient searching, assurances 
of the highest quality music, and security from copyright infringement 
claims—more and more consumers should flock to legal music delivery 
services. 
Most importantly, the interests of webcasters and sound recording copy-
right owners will be aligned under the new statutory scheme. The more 
users that webcasting services obtain, the more subscription fees and 
advertising revenue they receive. Consequently, record labels will receive 
higher payments through established compulsory royalties. The mutual 
desire of webcasters and record labels to increase legal music consumption 
and market share will induce record companies to promote successful 
webcasting services, in addition to physical and digital album purchases. 
With the vast resources of the major record companies behind interactive 
webcasters, costs can be further lowered and services will become more 
efficient. All in all, more consumers will be driven into the interactive 
webcasting market, raising annual revenues and profits for the entire 
streaming music industry. 
By creating a system that can effectively curb and diminish music piracy 
throughout the world, the entire music industry can achieve consistent 
growth for the first time in many years. As the webcasting industry advances 
and consumers benefit from the convenience and availability of millions of 
songs at the touch of a button, streaming music delivery will lead to a 
greater number of consumers turning to these legal means of music 
consumption: the risks and inconveniences associated with individually 
searching for and using pirated music will no longer be worth it. 
Record labels will also have lower costs once they no longer have to incur 
litigation expenses by trying to enforce their copyrights. As evidenced by 
the recording industry’s numerous past and current attempts to combat 
music piracy, the money spent on enforcing sound recording copyrights, 
whether against large P2P services or individual infringers, is rarely recouped 
through favorable decisions or orders.244 Further, less infringement should 
 
243 See Andrews, supra note 132 (reporting that Spotify acquired over one million paid sub-
scribers within three months and now has over five million paying customers worldwide).  
244 Even if found liable by the courts, individual defendants in illegal downloading suits are 
often judgment-proof and unable to pay. See David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, 
After 5 Years of RIAA Litigation, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2008/09/proving-file-sh (quoting Casey Lentz, a former student sued by the RIAA, who explains 
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occur generally as legal forms of music delivery and webcasting begin to 
satisfy the needs and desires of consumers better than illegal downloading 
or streaming services.  
Though sound recording copyright owners will no longer have the right 
to exclude interactive webcasters from using their works, they should be 
adequately compensated by the overall growth of the music industry and the 
guaranteed royalty payments that will be enforced and distributed by 
SoundExchange. No longer will record labels have to individually negotiate 
with potential users and police the world for copyright infringement. 
Instead, they can benefit from the efficiency and decreased costs of collec-
tive action and put their valuable resources to better use. 
Finally, since the mid-1990s, the public perception of the recording 
industry has been severely marred. By embracing new technologies and 
shifting consumer preferences, record labels can hopefully mend their 
damaged reputations. By offering consumers personalized services and 
access to a greater variety of music, record labels will benefit from the 
positive public relations effects that will result. While it is likely that record 
labels will continue to be criticized for the sometimes one-sided contracts 
and arrangements they enter into with recording artists,245 the media will no 
longer be dominated by negative stories concerning powerful record labels 
suing less fortunate end users. Record labels will no longer have to pursue 
legislation that media companies, website operators, and the public view as 
“censorship.”246 The improved reputation of and diminished hostility toward 
the recording industry will hopefully result in even less illegal downloading 
and streaming by users. By incentivizing consumers to engage in legal music 
consumption, the new statutory rate scheme will benefit record labels the most.  
While the establishment of a compulsory license may not prove to be 
the answer to all of the music industry’s problems, amending the Copyright 
Act would be a significant step in the right direction. Under this new 
structure, music piracy would be more effectively curtailed, and pirates 
would no longer be able to as easily siphon off profits that rightfully belong 
 
that the major record labels “want[ed] $7,500 for 10 [illegally downloaded] songs,” but she “only 
had $500 in [her] bank account”). 
245 See Mike Masnick, Record Labels Screwing Over Musicians Is Nothing New; The Buddy Holly 
Edition, TECHDIRT (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100201/0234157986.shtml 
(discussing how record labels have a history of failing to protect musicians’ interests and suggest-
ing that digital technology may provide performing artists with more bargaining power). 
246 See Melissa Knowles, Popular Websites to Go Dark Over SOPA Controversy, YAHOO! 
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/trending-now/popular-websites-dark-
over-sopa-controversy-174211626.html (discussing the recent boycott that website operators 
initiated in response to two proposed congressional bills). 
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to the recording industry. As music piracy decreases, annual revenues for 
record labels will inevitably increase. As a result, the recording industry 
may very well be able to exceed the $14.6 billion annual revenue plateau 
reached in the late 1990s.247 By embracing a novel solution that harnesses 
innovative and promising technologies and capitalizes on consumer prefer-
ences, annual revenues may reach a level that no one would have thought 
possible in recent years.  
CONCLUSION 
Under a new, more affordable statutory framework, the benefits and 
decreased costs associated with using legal interactive webcasting services 
can finally exceed the advantages many people find in illegal file sharing. 
More consumers will begin paying for legal access to music due to the 
decreased transaction costs, superior services, safety from corrupted files, 
and extinguished threat of expensive litigation provided by interactive 
webcasters.248 The decrease in CD sales and corresponding rapid increase in 
digital music file purchases demonstrate that consumers “prefer more 
convenient formats, that they resist having the songs they want being tied to 
songs they do not want, and that they want the prices they are charged to 
reflect the much lower costs of production and distribution which new 
technologies make possible.”249  
There is strong evidence that consumers are still willing to purchase 
music.250 Despite the meteoric rise of music piracy in the Internet era, 
consumers have shown a willingness to purchase songs through iTunes or 
join subscription-based interactive webcasters such as Rhapsody and 
Spotify.251 Simply stated, if “services have proven themselves, it is plausible 
 
247 For example, as vocalist and songwriter D.A. Wallach explained, Spotify is “trying to 
create . . . a system in which you earn royalties forever for good music.” King, supra note 200. He 
further clarified that, “[i]f you took the effective per play rate that I’ve paid for every time I’ve 
listened to my Dark Side of The Moon CD, it would be trivial compared to what I’d have generated 
if I’d done all that listening on Spotify.” Id. 
248 See Perritt, supra note 7, at 208-09 (arguing that record labels can effectively compete 
with the presence of free music in the marketplace by offering consumers advantages that pirated 
music cannot provide). 
249 Id. at 90. 
250 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 297-98 (2004) 
(predicting that growth in wireless Internet technology will result in people being more willing to 
pay to stream content from service providers than to purchase and own permanent copies of 
copyrighted works). 
251 See Andrews, supra note 132 (revealing that as of the end of 2012, even though Spotify has 
only operated in the United States for a little over a year, the service has quickly gained over one 
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that consumers will be willing to pay something, especially on a subscrip-
tion basis, for the service, even though they theoretically could spend 200 
days per year finding the music themselves.”252 
It is true that record labels will no longer be able to refuse access to 
copyrighted works or deny the use of sound recordings that they own. 
Sound recording copyright owners thus have a legitimate short-term fear 
that profits will suffer as the royalty rates established by the CRB may lead 
to a significant displacement of album sales.253 But, in addition to incentiv-
izing consumers to engage in legal music consumption, “[b]y removing the 
transaction cost problem associated with individual license negotiations, 
[compulsory] licensing would make it easier for webcasters that provide 
interactive services to comply with the law.”254  
As a result, music piracy will decrease, litigation costs will decline, and 
though royalty fees, when broken down on a per-stream basis, may be less 
than what record labels desire, overall royalty revenue received from 
webcasters will inevitably increase.255 If the mission of major record labels is 
to increase their annual revenues and combat music piracy affordably, then 
amending the Copyright Act to establish a compulsory license for interactive 
webcasters seems to be one of the most effective ways to accomplish that goal. 
 
 
million monthly subscribers and now has over twenty million active users utilizing either the free 
ad-supported or the subscription options worldwide).  
252 Perritt, supra note 7, at 209; see also Rajiv K. Sinha & Naomi Mandel, Preventing Digital 
Music Piracy: The Carrot or the Stick?, 72 J. MARKETING 1, 1 (2008) (“[T]he success of iTunes and 
other legal file-sharing Web sites seems to indicate that . . . a portion of music consumers are 
willing to pay a positive amount to download music legally.” (citation omitted)). 
253 But see Hardman, supra note 10, at 314 (explaining how short-term consequences will 
likely be offset by long-term gains in terms of total revenue). 
254 Id.; see also Stephenson, supra note 16, at 409-10 (“The organized nature of copyright 
owners versus the disparate interests of copyright users ensures the continued need for a statutory 
system to deliver the policy goals of broad access to the copyrighted materials and fair return for 
the copyright owners.”). 
255 See Henslee, supra note 151, at 747 (“[C]opyright legislation must ensure the necessary 
balance between giving authors necessary monetary incentive without limiting access to an 
author’s works.” (footnote omitted)); Hardman, supra note 10, at 317 (“Removing the interactivity 
distinction entirely and replacing it with a blanket compulsory licensing scheme stands out among 
other solutions as the one that best negotiates the balance between . . . protecting record sales and 
encouraging the continued creation of music, and . . . the Constitutional mandate of promoting 
progress by encouraging the development of new technologies and new media.”); see also Myers & 
Howard, supra note 35, at 239 (stating that “public performance royalties would clearly bolster 
overall revenues in the music business”). 
